http://64.26.31.21:2010/Spec/06-2007/Article-20070607-05b36b79-c0a8-10ed-01b1-699605136670/story.html
Algeria: Layada to al-Hayat: I Set up the GIA to Defend Not to Kill the Algerian People. Antar Zouabri is a Timid Youngster Who did not join the militants in the mountain carrying a Bottle of Wine. - Part II - (by Camille Tawil)
Camille Tawil Al - Hayat - 07/06/07//
Baraki (Algeria)- "We took up arms to defend the people not to kill them", a phrase repeated by the Emir of the Armed Islamic Group, who was recently released from prison after serving 13 years during which his country sunk in "pools of blood", largely shed by the GIA whose founder and first Emir in October 1992 was killed.
But Abdelhak Layada (Abu Adlane) did not try to disavow his past. He told al-Hayat that he actually took up arms against the Algerian government in the belief that he was "defending the people" in the face of a regime that had "canceled their votes" when it abrogated the results of the 1991 elections, but he never knew that the group that he founded would turn in a few years into "a monster" eating away at the body of the people that he took up arms to defend.
The GIA Emir was speaking to al-Hayat in his modest house in the impoverished suburb of Baraki area in the Algerian capital. Baraki and the adjacent regions constituted a human reservoir of armed groups in the 1990s. They had been for long periods 'liberated areas' that neither security personnel nor government servicemen had the guts to enter at night. Of course, that era ended now, but the region remains a security concern in the light of suspicions that militant groups' activists still enjoy relative freedom of movement there.
Layada expressed reservations elaborating on the origins of the GIA, as he does not want to cause embarrassment to some co-founders, although most of the founders have already died. Nonetheless, he was dissatisfied with the fact that leaders in the banned 'Islamic Salvation Front' (FIS) have disavowed the violence that took place in Algeria in the early 1990s, passing the buck to the others, particularly the GIA. "It is them that drove the people to do what they have done", said Layada implying that those who took up arms against the regime were abetted and egged on by the FIS leaders to embark upon Jihad.
Abu Adlane (Adlane, who attended the interview with his father, is a third-year college student) explained the reason for his reservations, saying: "If I speak now about some matters with regard to the emergence of the GIA we might harm leaders in FIS, the State and even politicians from foreign countries". Names and details must wait, as "time has not yet come" to uncover everything the Emir has.
Layada is not trying to deny his responsibility for founding the GIA, but what concerns him is to distance himself from its course during the 'bloody years'. "I took up arms to defend and restore the people's rights, not to kill them. Our principle was to protect our country", Layada told al-Hayat. "I disavow the massacres and the killing of innocent people. I never took up arms to kill people", he added.
Layada, a former car mechanic, took over the GIA leadership in the autumn of 1992, months after the cancellation of elections and the start 'armed action' against the regime. But his leadership was short-lived, as Morocco arrested him in the summer of 1993 and handed him over to the Algerian authorities in August 1993. He said he was not detained in Morocco, but he met with senior Moroccan officials that tried to make an agreement with him on matters "I rejected", in a reference to the conflict in Western Sahara and Algeria's support for the Polisario Front that seeks the territory's independence from Morocco. "They told me I am worth a hundredweight of gold", before being handed over by Moroccan officials to the Algerians.
His arrest in Morocco and extradition to Algeria had no effect in the beginning on the march of the GIA. Instead of falling behind with its construction at his absence, the result was completely the opposite: the group rocketed to fame and became in a short period the master of armed action on the ground and the powerful organization. In July 1993 he was succeeded by Isa bin Ammar, who was killed weeks later. He was replaced by Jaafar al-Afghani, who began to extend the circle of fighting to include foreigners living in Algeria. But Jaafar's leadership was short-lived as he was killed by security forces in February 1994 and was replaced by Cherif Gousmi, who managed two months after assuming the Emirate to bring about an alliance under the umbrella of the GIA. It included a wing from the Islamic Salvation Front led by Sheikh Mohamed Said (leader of the Algerisation trend), and the 'Movement for an Islamic State' led by Sheikh Abdelkader Chebouti and Said Makhloufi. But Gousmi's leadership did not last long as he was killed by security forces in September 1994, before being replaced by Djamel Zitouni.
Under Zitouni's leadership the GIA experienced a total deviation that overstepped all boundaries in 1997 when his assistant and close ally Antar Zouabri took over as the new Emir. Zouabri considered the Algerian people as apostates and allowed genocide against them.
All these developments took place while Layada was in Serkadji prison (where he survived a horrendous massacre in 1995 that claimed the lives of about 100 prisoners when security forces attempted to crush a prisoners' rebellion). But Layada, who sometimes seems proud of GIA even during his absence in prison, quickly condemned its deviation, though he himself was surprised how it happened.
He is proud that the group was a large military force that managed to stand in the face of the security forces for long periods in the 1990s. "All generals of Algeria were not able to enter Talaacheh in that period. The Green Battalion (the strike force in GIA formed by Djamel Zitouni) under the command of Antar Zouabri (former commander of the Battalion and GIA's leader since 1997) had a law providing that lying on the ground is against Islamic Sharia even under aerial bombardment. Running away during confrontations was also impermissible. If you escape you will be killed. The Green Battalion in the mountain was fired on and was responding with fire. Whenever they (army personnel) advance on Talaacheh dozens of them get killed and the GIA takes their weapons while the army withdraws", Layada said of GIA's stronghold in Talaacheh (Blida province south of the capital).
However, this boastfulness of the GIA's 'acts of heroism' quickly disappears when the issue of massacres attributed to GIA under Zouabri's leadership is raised. Layada, who knows Antar from his brother Ali, a co-founder of GIA, seems puzzled today how Antar changed from an ordinary soldier that blushes if you speak to him to a 'bloody emir' that has no scruples about spilling the blood of millions of Algerians on the basis that they became 'renegades' because they did not join the group.
"I swear by Allah that Antar went up the mountain while holding the Qur'an in his hand. It is not true that he went up the mountain with a bottle of wine in his hand. There were exchanged killings between Antar group and Mustapha Kartali group (there is enmity and rift between the two groups. Kartali's claim that Antar was drinking wine while he was climbing up the mountain comes in the framework of differences between them). But, I swear by Allah Almighty, his face goes red with shyness. When I heard what he has done (massacres) I did not believe. I was never convinced of what happened", he said.
Apparently there is some confusion about Antar's drinking wine before going up the mountain. Layada has the right to defend him by saying that he went up the mountain "holding the Qur'an in his hand, not a bottle of wine", but apparently he who talked about Antar's relation with wine was talking about his past before joining GIA.
Antar was brought up in the extremely impoverished alley of Karou in Boufarik (in the province of Blida, south of the Algerian capital). It is no secret today that he and his brothers formed a gang of villainous thieves. But what happened was that the brother was arrested and imprisoned in 1989 - 1990 and he became an Islamist when he came out of prison. He persuaded his brothers to abide by Islamic obligations.
One of Antar's old friends told al-Hayat that Antar told him that he and his brothers' becoming religious did not appeal to even some of their family members, who had once visited them and found that Antar and his brothers had shortened the table's legs to the ground and they were eating while sitting on the floor instead of chairs (some Salafists justify this as being a Sunni tradition).
Until today there are still 'shades of grey' about how Antar changed from a shy young man at the beginning of military action to such a 'bloody' man capable of regarding the whole Algerian people as renegades, although it is clear that what happened to his family undoubtedly was a motive for what he did.
It has been said that non-Islamist extremists savagely mutilated the bodies of some of his family members. Security forces killed Antar in 2002 and released his first and second wives, although he had only one girl from one of them.
He was yearning for a boy, as his former friend said. In the end, he is known in the mountain by 'Abi Talha'.
Tuesday, 30 October 2007
Secrets and Internal Liquidations Part III
http://64.26.31.21:2010/Spec/06-2007/Article-20070613-23f05146-c0a8-10ed-01b1-699614ba9c45/story.html
Lakhdaria Emir Reveals Secrets and Internal Liquidations of the Mountain, GIA Emir was Accused of Becoming Shiite After Some Elements Received Training in Lebanon. - Part III - (by Camille Tawil)
Camille al-Tawil Al-Hayat - 13/06/07//
Only a few leaders of the militant groups, who were behind the 1990s incidents, survived to tell the truth about what was happening in their strongholds in the mountains of Algeria. The majority of survivors chose to remain silent.
Omar Sheikhi (Abu Rokaya) was not one of those. The Emir of Lakhdaria in Bouira province (southeast of the Algerian capital), does not deny that he was one of the closest associates of the GIA leaders, including Djamel Zitouni and Antar Zouabri, who were described as the most bloody and extremist leaders. He was in fact a member of the few people forming the 'the inner circle', even when the group started to break up and the battalion commanders and warlords began to dissociate themselves from it. Given the personal relations he enjoyed with the 'mountain warlords', Omar can blow the lid off what was happening between the leaders of groups: their differences, the "inquisitions" they set up and the liquidation of many of them.
Sheikhi lives today in the Algerian capital. He came down from the mountain in the second half of the 1990s. It was reported that he had not come down out of his own will, as he was arrested by security services before reaching an agreement with them to benefit from the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Omar Sheikhi descended from the mountain, leaving behind his brother, a member of the GIA who was killed in a battle with Algerian security forces in 1994, and three of his wife's brothers, who were all killed in battles with security forces in the 1990s. He also left behind many of his comrade-in-arms and part of his past.
Sheikhi is trying to rebuild his life after spending many years in what the Algerians call 'Kazimat' - a euphemism for the militant hideouts in the mountains. But he knows that he cannot escape forever from his past. His 11-year-old daughter, Rokaya, is asking him about her uncle and three maternal uncles. "I tell her they died in a traffic accident. But I know she no longer believes me. She must be hearing news from her classmates, friends and neighbors. My son is still young (eight years old), but undoubtedly he will know the truth."
What follows is the story as told by Sheikhi, whom 'al-Hayat' has met twice in Algiers last month, about the mountain's secrets.
Going up the Mountain and the Emergence of GIA
"We were active in a group known as the 'Lakhdaria Group', which was widely believed to be affiliated to the Islamic Salvation Front. Although we began armed action after the cancellation of 1992 elections, I have been in hiding since the summer of 1991, when a clash took place between us and the security forces, which wanted to replace 'the Islamic Municipality' slogan with 'From and to the People' slogan at the Lakhdaria municipality. Therefore, we began preparation for the armed struggle. We contacted several groups that were active at the time, such as Abdelkader Chebouti's Movement for an Islamic State (MEI), brother Mansur Meliani's movement (the Afghans) and brother Mohamed Allal (Moh Leveilley), who had his own group comprising Ali Zouabri (brother of Antar Zouabri) and Abdelhaq Layada (the first Emir of GIA). There was also an independent group, Tawfik Hattab (who assassinated the former Prime Minister and former Intelligence Chief Kasdi Merbah and who is the older brother of Hassan Hattab, the founder of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). After the failure of Tamesguida meeting for the unity of the armed groups at the end of August and early September 1992, another meeting was held in Baraki (a suburb of Algiers), and it was attended by almost eight persons. In that meeting the Armed Islamic Group was established and Abdelhaq Layada (Abu Adlane) was appointed as Emir."
"Layada continued on as Emir until the summer of 1993 when he was arrested in Morocco. A meeting was held in Boukra (a GIA stronghold in Blida). The meeting witnessed the induction of Brother Isa Bin Ammar as Emir, but he was killed by the security forces only weeks after his appointment. He was promptly replaced by Jaafar al-Afghani (Sid Ahmed Mourad). Jaafar was a high-caliber fighter. His leadership lasted until February 1994 when he was killed by security forces, therefore he was replaced by the head of the GIA Sharia board, Cherif Gousmi, who orchestrated the unity under the umbrella of GIA (which included a faction from FIS led by Sheikh Mohammed Said and representatives of MEI led by Abdelkader Chebouti and Said Makhloufi, the former captain in the Algerian army). After the unity (which was announced in May 1994), efforts were made to incorporate the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), but to no avail. Afterwards Cherif Gousmi was killed in September 1994 and he was subsequently replaced by Djamel Zitouni."
FIS Letters
In that period (between 1993 and 1995), there were contacts between the Algerian government and the detained FIS elders, chiefly Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of violence in the country. Based on those contacts, the FIS leaders dispatched some of the released FIS sheikhs to the mountain to meet secretly with leaders of the militant groups. Consequently, contacts were made with AIS and GIA, what is the story of this communication?
Omar Sheikhi said:
"The Islamic Salvation Front had already contacted us in that period. Actually the FIS established two contacts: Abdelkader Boukhamkham and Ali Djeddi went to meet the national emir of the eastern area, Madani Mezrag, and the emir of the western area, Ahmed ben Aicha, while Kamal Kammazi contacted us. He went up the mountain in Boukra to meet us. Djamel Zitouni was the emir at the time. Zitouni, Antar Zouabri, Abu Saleh, Mohamed al-Saeed and I asked Kammazi, 'Sincerely speaking, are we in Jihad or not?' He said, 'Yes, you are.' We discussed the matter with him. A makeshift tent was prepared for him and Mohamed al-Saeed to sleep in. Among the things Mohamed Saeed, may Allah have mercy on him, said is, 'If you go to Sheikh Ali Belhadj (as he was placed under house arrest in the capital awaiting the result of the contacts between FIS leaders and the militant groups), please tell him not to mention the armed Islamic groups in his writings as this is an invitation to division. We were united (in 1994) under the GIA and any one who does not want to join the GIA is a man favors division.'"
"Kammazi also said, "Entry and exit from 'Jinan Mufti' (official residence where Belhadj was placed under house arrest) is simple. I will go and inform Sheikh Belhadj and the other sheikhs (FIS Sheikhs) how things happen and I will come back to you to join the fight.' Some members of the group opposed allowing him to leave the mountain. They said he should stay here. But he said that he had to go to inform Sheikh Ali Belhadj of what is happening. We told him he could do so. As for what happened between Ali Djeddi and Boukhamkham and the AIS leaders, only God knows. We had no news of them."
Sheikhi said, "Djeddi came to us at the time of Zitouni's leadership, but the contact with Ali Belhadj was established at the time of Cherif Gousmi's leadership. Ali Belhadj said in his message, which was found in Gousmi's pocket when he was killed (in September 1994), 'Continue Jihad and if I am released from prison I will be a soldier with you.' In fact, there were two letters from Belhadj during Zitouni's leadership. In the first he calls for dialogue and says that we have to sit and talk. He urged us to read a book on how to hold dialogue with the enemy. I think he sent us a copy of it. The second letter was a reply to a letter sent by Zitouni asking his opinion about photography in terms of Sharia and complaining to him about Mezrag's AIS as they refuse to join the unity and speak in the name of the Islamic Salvation Front. As far as I remember, Belhadj replied in his letter by saying, 'With regard to photography the scholars' fatwas must be followed, as there are opinions of Albany and Ibn Baz explaining when photography becomes a necessity, giving his own opinion on the matter.' In the second part of the letter he said, 'Mezrag is our brother and when I get out of prison, God willing, I will bring you together.' But the letter did not satisfy the group and the relationship with the FIS leaders was severed. We also received a letter from Sheikh Abbasi Madani about the dialogue, but it was incomprehensible."
At the end of Cherif Gousmi's term Mahfouz Tajin (Abu Khalil) took over for a very short period. Djamel Zitouni led a trend in the GIA called the 'Salafists' and he took over as Emir by himself. What is the truth of what happened?
Omar Sheikhi said, "When Cherif Gousmi was killed in September 1994 it was known that Mahfouz Tajin was his first deputy. Nevertheless, differences existed as Mahfouz Tajin was accused of being a Shiite and an Algerist (a reference to the Algerisation trend). There were too many accusations against him. Even in some compounds (GIA compounds) there were discussions about Mahfouz. Abu Abdallah Ahmed (Cherif Gousmi) considered that some of the accusations against Mahfouz can be untrue. However, he was eventually convinced that what is being said against him is true: It is true that he belongs to the Algerisation trend and to the Shiites. He was ready to open an investigation about him, but his fate was sealed. When Gousmi was killed members of the Shura Council, such as Khalid al-Sahili, Ayub and Ali al-Afghani held a meeting. There was the Emir and the deputy Emir. Naturally if the Emir is killed his deputy replaces him. But a large number of brigade commanders in the capital, as well as in some areas, were not satisfied with Mahfouz. A group met in the 'first region' and Zitouni accompanied them to the GIA's base where Mahfouz Tajin relinquished the leadership to Zitouni.
Al-Hayat: What is the background of the accusations against Mahfouz of being 'Shiite'?
Omar Sheikhi says, "His step to send fighters to be trained in Lebanon was one of the reasons that raised doubts about him. Kouasmi asked him about this. He literally replied, 'We use the Iranian Shiites, but do not follow their approach.' Kouasmi said, 'You can't use the Shiites, they will use you. Beware and beware! I've sent a delegation (to Hezbollah in Lebanon) beware of sending another delegation.' But Mahfouz paid no attention to this, so he prepared another group to go to Lebanon. An investigation was made with the people who went to Lebanon. I was one of the people who investigated them. It was an ordinary investigation. They were not satisfied with the exercises. (They said) their approach is at loggerhead with ours.
They used to go to Syria and head from there to Lebanon. Their representative was called Rashid A, he based himself in Syria. In fact, he was Mahfouz's representative, but he was serving as a representative of the GIA. In the period when Zitouni was the Emir, (the Emir) told him to return from Syria to Algeria, but he refused, saying 'My Emir is Mahfouz'."
Al-Hayat: How did the relationship between Mahfouz and the Iranians begin?
"Mahfouz went to Lebanon himself, where he remained for nearly six months. This was in 1991, when he wanted to go to war in Iraq (there was a large group of Algerians, who had prepared themselves to go to Iraq for jihad against the US forces during the Gulf War in 1991). Mahfouz went to Syria with a view of going to Iraq, but he met leader of the Islamic Jihad Organization in Palestine, Fathi Shikaki, by accident (in Syria). Shikaki said to (the Algerians), 'What are you doing here?' Both spoke for a short while, and then Shikaki (who was assassinated by Israel in the 1990s) told him that if he wanted to go to Lebanon they would facilitate this for him.
Mahfouz said, "There was no problem, let's go to Lebanon." Shikaki arranged everything for them. He left them in a villa and after some time, they were admitted to a hospital in Lebanon where they stayed six months. They were admitted to the hospital through Fathi Shikaki. He told us that he performed prayers with the Shiites and did so and so with them. But we did not blame him for entering Lebanon at the time. Later on, we started to see messages coming to him from Shiite clerics in Syria, which scared the GIA. They (the Shiite clerics) dealt with Mahfouz directly (not through the GIA leadership).
Sheikhi relates a story that took place on the mountain after Mahfouz Tajin had stepped down from his position as Emir, "Mahfouz remained a member of the Shura Council of the GIA after he had stepped down in favor of Zitouni. I remember that we were riding a car on the road to Boukra (the GIA's stronghold) and we met some of the brothers. The place was dark, so we thought that we were locked in an ambush by the army. But our brothers were from among our group. They knew us, even though we did not recognize them. So, we opened the car and jumped out. Mahfouz threw himself out of the car and (his leg) was fractured. He was splinted for a long time. He stayed in the capital until he recovered. We used to send someone to him when we needed him."
Zitouni's Character
Al-Hayat: Who was Djamel Zitouni, the Emir at whose era the GIA started to adopt a takfiri attitude and 'Inquisitions' against members of the GIA themselves took place?
Sheikhi says, "His real name is Djamel Zitouni. He was born in 1968 in Birkhadem in the capital. His education was average, but he mastered Arabic and French. His Islamic background was average. He learned at the hands of Sherif Kouasmi and read about Sharia with him. He started a business (a store for selling chickens). He was married with no children. He was Deputy Chief of the Executive Office of the 'Islamic Salvation Front' (FIS) in Birkhadem. He was arrested in the 1991 incidents and detained in prison in the Sahara for approximately five or six months. When he was released he engaged in armed action. He was a friend of Jaafar al-Afghani (the third Emir of the GIA). He was a courageous fighter, liked and respected religious scholars and Islamic officers. (...) In the beginning, he was appointed emir of a brigade in Birkhadem. He was the founder and emir of the 'Green Battalion'. He used to select its fighters from other battalions. He chose the best elements in terms of morals, obedience and fighting. The battalion started with 40 fighters, but this number used to increase and decrease, it was directly affiliated to him, as it included the Diwan of the Emir and his own guards.
(...) Zitouni chose the stronghold of the GIA in Boukra, which is a vast mountainous area. The army discovered and stormed the GIA strongholds in Blida, but there were some strongholds at Boukra, which the army failed to reach. That is why Zitouni chose it as headquarters of the GIA in agreement with some elements of the 'Green Battalion'. They told him, 'Choose an area or we'll choose it for you'. He chose it himself. It was decided that the members of the Shura Council and members of the 'Ahlul Hal Wal'aqd' (people of power and influence) should always accompany him, at a time when the people who moved frequently used not to come to the center (headquarters of the GIA). When they used to come, they did so in a way that did not allow them to recognize the site, i.e. blindfolded or at night in a closed car. That was his way, and we agreed on it. We set up some three command centers in Boukra and Zitouni used to move from one area to another. The advantage of Boukra is that it is a mountainous area similar to the Sharia and the Medea areas. The army failed to know the command areas of the GIA in Boukra at the time; that is why it did not attack us."
Conflict with the Takfiris
Al-Hayat: The GIA detached itself away from the takfiri ideology in the 1990s and described itself as 'Salafist Jihad'. This was before its leader, Antar Zouabri, took over as Emir in 1997 to declare the Algerian masses as 'infidels' in his 'public apostasy' statement. Was not the GIA takfiri?
Sheikhi says, "The GIA was at loggerheads with the takfiris. Clashes began when the takfiris assaulted the family of a man from Alonchris and swore at his daughters. The man complained to the GIA, which in turn raided their command and found a jumble of arms, including Iraqi weapons. The second time, a coincidental clash took place between the two parties, in which the GIA killed all the takfiris, who were in the confrontation. But from time to time clashes with the takfiris took place at Alonchris Mountains."
GIA Breakup
Al-Hayat: At the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, the GIA began to disintegrate, as Djamel Zitouni and a group of Emirs, who allied with him, killed the leader of the 'Algerianization' trend, Sheikh Mohammed al-Saeed (along with Abdurrazzaq Rajjam) on a charge of 'conspiracy' over the 'Salafist approach' of the GIA. What happened in that period?
Sheikhi says, "Before his death, Zitouni was commissioned by Radwan Abuseer (External Relations Officer in the GIA) the task of persuading the groups to stay within the framework of GIA, in light of the rifts that occurred following the murders of Mohammed al-Saeed and Abdurrazzaq Rajjam. However, Radwan's failure to persuade the people not to leave the GIA caused substantial differences between him and Zitouni. The latter felt that Radwan - called Mcador, a title which he did not like because it was the name of a European soccer goalkeeper - abandoned him. Zitouni felt isolated. Antar Zouabri fled to Bufariq and rested. I told him that I would not come to him, and went to the capital where I rested for a while. He used to tell me, 'I'm with this brigade, so let's meet.' However, I said I couldn't involve myself in these problems (in light of the murder of al-Saeed). Zitouni asked me to go the battalions to persuade them not to depart from the GIA. But how could I persuade them? I told him, 'If Mcador failed to persuade the people, how can I? You start trouble, and Antar starts trouble too (by killing the Algerianization group). I will not do this.' Zitouni began to cry profusely. In an attempt to involve me, he asked me to take over external relations (in place of Radwan Mcador). I told him that I wouldn't. Abdurrazaq al-Bara, who is currently detained, and I took a tour from Blida to Medea. On the road, I met Sakhr al-Libi (from the Afghan Libyans who fought with the GIA). Zitouni spoke to him and gave him powers. But I told Sakhr, 'Go to Libya. You should not remain here with the battalions to explain that they should remain within the framework of the GIA and not depart from it.' I returned to the headquarters of the GIA, but I did not meet Zitouni. I sent him a letter. During that journey, I was wounded on the road, as I fell in an ambush by the army. I was hit in the leg and could not walk. The Diwan Officer came (in July 1996) and told me that Hassan (one of Djamel Zitouni's epithets) was killed, as he fell in an ambush by the GIA's dissenters. Therefore, Antar Zouabri took over as Emir. At that period, individuals and groups began to break away from the GIA. Among the dissenters was Abu Khaled (Chouakri), who has been in Afghanistan, and Abu Lubaba, who was the bodyguard of Djamel Zitouni. Both broke away from the GIA. Abu Khaled had a good relationship with Sakhr al-Libi. Immediately after Abu Khaled broke away, Antar Zouabri followers went to Sakhr and tortured him severely (they plucked out a platinum rod that was implanted in his hand while he was still alive). Antar was not present during the torture session. He was at a remote center in al-Broakiya. He was with a battalion that was completely loyal to him. They forced Sakhr to make depositions, but I do not know what he told them.
Zouabri killed Radwan (Mcador) in 1997. Radwan was in the third year at the university when he joined the GIA. His brother Sofian was also killed in the mountain in a confrontation with the army in 1993 or 1994."
Lakhdaria Emir Reveals Secrets and Internal Liquidations of the Mountain, GIA Emir was Accused of Becoming Shiite After Some Elements Received Training in Lebanon. - Part III - (by Camille Tawil)
Camille al-Tawil Al-Hayat - 13/06/07//
Only a few leaders of the militant groups, who were behind the 1990s incidents, survived to tell the truth about what was happening in their strongholds in the mountains of Algeria. The majority of survivors chose to remain silent.
Omar Sheikhi (Abu Rokaya) was not one of those. The Emir of Lakhdaria in Bouira province (southeast of the Algerian capital), does not deny that he was one of the closest associates of the GIA leaders, including Djamel Zitouni and Antar Zouabri, who were described as the most bloody and extremist leaders. He was in fact a member of the few people forming the 'the inner circle', even when the group started to break up and the battalion commanders and warlords began to dissociate themselves from it. Given the personal relations he enjoyed with the 'mountain warlords', Omar can blow the lid off what was happening between the leaders of groups: their differences, the "inquisitions" they set up and the liquidation of many of them.
Sheikhi lives today in the Algerian capital. He came down from the mountain in the second half of the 1990s. It was reported that he had not come down out of his own will, as he was arrested by security services before reaching an agreement with them to benefit from the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Omar Sheikhi descended from the mountain, leaving behind his brother, a member of the GIA who was killed in a battle with Algerian security forces in 1994, and three of his wife's brothers, who were all killed in battles with security forces in the 1990s. He also left behind many of his comrade-in-arms and part of his past.
Sheikhi is trying to rebuild his life after spending many years in what the Algerians call 'Kazimat' - a euphemism for the militant hideouts in the mountains. But he knows that he cannot escape forever from his past. His 11-year-old daughter, Rokaya, is asking him about her uncle and three maternal uncles. "I tell her they died in a traffic accident. But I know she no longer believes me. She must be hearing news from her classmates, friends and neighbors. My son is still young (eight years old), but undoubtedly he will know the truth."
What follows is the story as told by Sheikhi, whom 'al-Hayat' has met twice in Algiers last month, about the mountain's secrets.
Going up the Mountain and the Emergence of GIA
"We were active in a group known as the 'Lakhdaria Group', which was widely believed to be affiliated to the Islamic Salvation Front. Although we began armed action after the cancellation of 1992 elections, I have been in hiding since the summer of 1991, when a clash took place between us and the security forces, which wanted to replace 'the Islamic Municipality' slogan with 'From and to the People' slogan at the Lakhdaria municipality. Therefore, we began preparation for the armed struggle. We contacted several groups that were active at the time, such as Abdelkader Chebouti's Movement for an Islamic State (MEI), brother Mansur Meliani's movement (the Afghans) and brother Mohamed Allal (Moh Leveilley), who had his own group comprising Ali Zouabri (brother of Antar Zouabri) and Abdelhaq Layada (the first Emir of GIA). There was also an independent group, Tawfik Hattab (who assassinated the former Prime Minister and former Intelligence Chief Kasdi Merbah and who is the older brother of Hassan Hattab, the founder of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). After the failure of Tamesguida meeting for the unity of the armed groups at the end of August and early September 1992, another meeting was held in Baraki (a suburb of Algiers), and it was attended by almost eight persons. In that meeting the Armed Islamic Group was established and Abdelhaq Layada (Abu Adlane) was appointed as Emir."
"Layada continued on as Emir until the summer of 1993 when he was arrested in Morocco. A meeting was held in Boukra (a GIA stronghold in Blida). The meeting witnessed the induction of Brother Isa Bin Ammar as Emir, but he was killed by the security forces only weeks after his appointment. He was promptly replaced by Jaafar al-Afghani (Sid Ahmed Mourad). Jaafar was a high-caliber fighter. His leadership lasted until February 1994 when he was killed by security forces, therefore he was replaced by the head of the GIA Sharia board, Cherif Gousmi, who orchestrated the unity under the umbrella of GIA (which included a faction from FIS led by Sheikh Mohammed Said and representatives of MEI led by Abdelkader Chebouti and Said Makhloufi, the former captain in the Algerian army). After the unity (which was announced in May 1994), efforts were made to incorporate the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), but to no avail. Afterwards Cherif Gousmi was killed in September 1994 and he was subsequently replaced by Djamel Zitouni."
FIS Letters
In that period (between 1993 and 1995), there were contacts between the Algerian government and the detained FIS elders, chiefly Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhadj, in order to reach an agreement on the cessation of violence in the country. Based on those contacts, the FIS leaders dispatched some of the released FIS sheikhs to the mountain to meet secretly with leaders of the militant groups. Consequently, contacts were made with AIS and GIA, what is the story of this communication?
Omar Sheikhi said:
"The Islamic Salvation Front had already contacted us in that period. Actually the FIS established two contacts: Abdelkader Boukhamkham and Ali Djeddi went to meet the national emir of the eastern area, Madani Mezrag, and the emir of the western area, Ahmed ben Aicha, while Kamal Kammazi contacted us. He went up the mountain in Boukra to meet us. Djamel Zitouni was the emir at the time. Zitouni, Antar Zouabri, Abu Saleh, Mohamed al-Saeed and I asked Kammazi, 'Sincerely speaking, are we in Jihad or not?' He said, 'Yes, you are.' We discussed the matter with him. A makeshift tent was prepared for him and Mohamed al-Saeed to sleep in. Among the things Mohamed Saeed, may Allah have mercy on him, said is, 'If you go to Sheikh Ali Belhadj (as he was placed under house arrest in the capital awaiting the result of the contacts between FIS leaders and the militant groups), please tell him not to mention the armed Islamic groups in his writings as this is an invitation to division. We were united (in 1994) under the GIA and any one who does not want to join the GIA is a man favors division.'"
"Kammazi also said, "Entry and exit from 'Jinan Mufti' (official residence where Belhadj was placed under house arrest) is simple. I will go and inform Sheikh Belhadj and the other sheikhs (FIS Sheikhs) how things happen and I will come back to you to join the fight.' Some members of the group opposed allowing him to leave the mountain. They said he should stay here. But he said that he had to go to inform Sheikh Ali Belhadj of what is happening. We told him he could do so. As for what happened between Ali Djeddi and Boukhamkham and the AIS leaders, only God knows. We had no news of them."
Sheikhi said, "Djeddi came to us at the time of Zitouni's leadership, but the contact with Ali Belhadj was established at the time of Cherif Gousmi's leadership. Ali Belhadj said in his message, which was found in Gousmi's pocket when he was killed (in September 1994), 'Continue Jihad and if I am released from prison I will be a soldier with you.' In fact, there were two letters from Belhadj during Zitouni's leadership. In the first he calls for dialogue and says that we have to sit and talk. He urged us to read a book on how to hold dialogue with the enemy. I think he sent us a copy of it. The second letter was a reply to a letter sent by Zitouni asking his opinion about photography in terms of Sharia and complaining to him about Mezrag's AIS as they refuse to join the unity and speak in the name of the Islamic Salvation Front. As far as I remember, Belhadj replied in his letter by saying, 'With regard to photography the scholars' fatwas must be followed, as there are opinions of Albany and Ibn Baz explaining when photography becomes a necessity, giving his own opinion on the matter.' In the second part of the letter he said, 'Mezrag is our brother and when I get out of prison, God willing, I will bring you together.' But the letter did not satisfy the group and the relationship with the FIS leaders was severed. We also received a letter from Sheikh Abbasi Madani about the dialogue, but it was incomprehensible."
At the end of Cherif Gousmi's term Mahfouz Tajin (Abu Khalil) took over for a very short period. Djamel Zitouni led a trend in the GIA called the 'Salafists' and he took over as Emir by himself. What is the truth of what happened?
Omar Sheikhi said, "When Cherif Gousmi was killed in September 1994 it was known that Mahfouz Tajin was his first deputy. Nevertheless, differences existed as Mahfouz Tajin was accused of being a Shiite and an Algerist (a reference to the Algerisation trend). There were too many accusations against him. Even in some compounds (GIA compounds) there were discussions about Mahfouz. Abu Abdallah Ahmed (Cherif Gousmi) considered that some of the accusations against Mahfouz can be untrue. However, he was eventually convinced that what is being said against him is true: It is true that he belongs to the Algerisation trend and to the Shiites. He was ready to open an investigation about him, but his fate was sealed. When Gousmi was killed members of the Shura Council, such as Khalid al-Sahili, Ayub and Ali al-Afghani held a meeting. There was the Emir and the deputy Emir. Naturally if the Emir is killed his deputy replaces him. But a large number of brigade commanders in the capital, as well as in some areas, were not satisfied with Mahfouz. A group met in the 'first region' and Zitouni accompanied them to the GIA's base where Mahfouz Tajin relinquished the leadership to Zitouni.
Al-Hayat: What is the background of the accusations against Mahfouz of being 'Shiite'?
Omar Sheikhi says, "His step to send fighters to be trained in Lebanon was one of the reasons that raised doubts about him. Kouasmi asked him about this. He literally replied, 'We use the Iranian Shiites, but do not follow their approach.' Kouasmi said, 'You can't use the Shiites, they will use you. Beware and beware! I've sent a delegation (to Hezbollah in Lebanon) beware of sending another delegation.' But Mahfouz paid no attention to this, so he prepared another group to go to Lebanon. An investigation was made with the people who went to Lebanon. I was one of the people who investigated them. It was an ordinary investigation. They were not satisfied with the exercises. (They said) their approach is at loggerhead with ours.
They used to go to Syria and head from there to Lebanon. Their representative was called Rashid A, he based himself in Syria. In fact, he was Mahfouz's representative, but he was serving as a representative of the GIA. In the period when Zitouni was the Emir, (the Emir) told him to return from Syria to Algeria, but he refused, saying 'My Emir is Mahfouz'."
Al-Hayat: How did the relationship between Mahfouz and the Iranians begin?
"Mahfouz went to Lebanon himself, where he remained for nearly six months. This was in 1991, when he wanted to go to war in Iraq (there was a large group of Algerians, who had prepared themselves to go to Iraq for jihad against the US forces during the Gulf War in 1991). Mahfouz went to Syria with a view of going to Iraq, but he met leader of the Islamic Jihad Organization in Palestine, Fathi Shikaki, by accident (in Syria). Shikaki said to (the Algerians), 'What are you doing here?' Both spoke for a short while, and then Shikaki (who was assassinated by Israel in the 1990s) told him that if he wanted to go to Lebanon they would facilitate this for him.
Mahfouz said, "There was no problem, let's go to Lebanon." Shikaki arranged everything for them. He left them in a villa and after some time, they were admitted to a hospital in Lebanon where they stayed six months. They were admitted to the hospital through Fathi Shikaki. He told us that he performed prayers with the Shiites and did so and so with them. But we did not blame him for entering Lebanon at the time. Later on, we started to see messages coming to him from Shiite clerics in Syria, which scared the GIA. They (the Shiite clerics) dealt with Mahfouz directly (not through the GIA leadership).
Sheikhi relates a story that took place on the mountain after Mahfouz Tajin had stepped down from his position as Emir, "Mahfouz remained a member of the Shura Council of the GIA after he had stepped down in favor of Zitouni. I remember that we were riding a car on the road to Boukra (the GIA's stronghold) and we met some of the brothers. The place was dark, so we thought that we were locked in an ambush by the army. But our brothers were from among our group. They knew us, even though we did not recognize them. So, we opened the car and jumped out. Mahfouz threw himself out of the car and (his leg) was fractured. He was splinted for a long time. He stayed in the capital until he recovered. We used to send someone to him when we needed him."
Zitouni's Character
Al-Hayat: Who was Djamel Zitouni, the Emir at whose era the GIA started to adopt a takfiri attitude and 'Inquisitions' against members of the GIA themselves took place?
Sheikhi says, "His real name is Djamel Zitouni. He was born in 1968 in Birkhadem in the capital. His education was average, but he mastered Arabic and French. His Islamic background was average. He learned at the hands of Sherif Kouasmi and read about Sharia with him. He started a business (a store for selling chickens). He was married with no children. He was Deputy Chief of the Executive Office of the 'Islamic Salvation Front' (FIS) in Birkhadem. He was arrested in the 1991 incidents and detained in prison in the Sahara for approximately five or six months. When he was released he engaged in armed action. He was a friend of Jaafar al-Afghani (the third Emir of the GIA). He was a courageous fighter, liked and respected religious scholars and Islamic officers. (...) In the beginning, he was appointed emir of a brigade in Birkhadem. He was the founder and emir of the 'Green Battalion'. He used to select its fighters from other battalions. He chose the best elements in terms of morals, obedience and fighting. The battalion started with 40 fighters, but this number used to increase and decrease, it was directly affiliated to him, as it included the Diwan of the Emir and his own guards.
(...) Zitouni chose the stronghold of the GIA in Boukra, which is a vast mountainous area. The army discovered and stormed the GIA strongholds in Blida, but there were some strongholds at Boukra, which the army failed to reach. That is why Zitouni chose it as headquarters of the GIA in agreement with some elements of the 'Green Battalion'. They told him, 'Choose an area or we'll choose it for you'. He chose it himself. It was decided that the members of the Shura Council and members of the 'Ahlul Hal Wal'aqd' (people of power and influence) should always accompany him, at a time when the people who moved frequently used not to come to the center (headquarters of the GIA). When they used to come, they did so in a way that did not allow them to recognize the site, i.e. blindfolded or at night in a closed car. That was his way, and we agreed on it. We set up some three command centers in Boukra and Zitouni used to move from one area to another. The advantage of Boukra is that it is a mountainous area similar to the Sharia and the Medea areas. The army failed to know the command areas of the GIA in Boukra at the time; that is why it did not attack us."
Conflict with the Takfiris
Al-Hayat: The GIA detached itself away from the takfiri ideology in the 1990s and described itself as 'Salafist Jihad'. This was before its leader, Antar Zouabri, took over as Emir in 1997 to declare the Algerian masses as 'infidels' in his 'public apostasy' statement. Was not the GIA takfiri?
Sheikhi says, "The GIA was at loggerheads with the takfiris. Clashes began when the takfiris assaulted the family of a man from Alonchris and swore at his daughters. The man complained to the GIA, which in turn raided their command and found a jumble of arms, including Iraqi weapons. The second time, a coincidental clash took place between the two parties, in which the GIA killed all the takfiris, who were in the confrontation. But from time to time clashes with the takfiris took place at Alonchris Mountains."
GIA Breakup
Al-Hayat: At the end of 1995 and the beginning of 1996, the GIA began to disintegrate, as Djamel Zitouni and a group of Emirs, who allied with him, killed the leader of the 'Algerianization' trend, Sheikh Mohammed al-Saeed (along with Abdurrazzaq Rajjam) on a charge of 'conspiracy' over the 'Salafist approach' of the GIA. What happened in that period?
Sheikhi says, "Before his death, Zitouni was commissioned by Radwan Abuseer (External Relations Officer in the GIA) the task of persuading the groups to stay within the framework of GIA, in light of the rifts that occurred following the murders of Mohammed al-Saeed and Abdurrazzaq Rajjam. However, Radwan's failure to persuade the people not to leave the GIA caused substantial differences between him and Zitouni. The latter felt that Radwan - called Mcador, a title which he did not like because it was the name of a European soccer goalkeeper - abandoned him. Zitouni felt isolated. Antar Zouabri fled to Bufariq and rested. I told him that I would not come to him, and went to the capital where I rested for a while. He used to tell me, 'I'm with this brigade, so let's meet.' However, I said I couldn't involve myself in these problems (in light of the murder of al-Saeed). Zitouni asked me to go the battalions to persuade them not to depart from the GIA. But how could I persuade them? I told him, 'If Mcador failed to persuade the people, how can I? You start trouble, and Antar starts trouble too (by killing the Algerianization group). I will not do this.' Zitouni began to cry profusely. In an attempt to involve me, he asked me to take over external relations (in place of Radwan Mcador). I told him that I wouldn't. Abdurrazaq al-Bara, who is currently detained, and I took a tour from Blida to Medea. On the road, I met Sakhr al-Libi (from the Afghan Libyans who fought with the GIA). Zitouni spoke to him and gave him powers. But I told Sakhr, 'Go to Libya. You should not remain here with the battalions to explain that they should remain within the framework of the GIA and not depart from it.' I returned to the headquarters of the GIA, but I did not meet Zitouni. I sent him a letter. During that journey, I was wounded on the road, as I fell in an ambush by the army. I was hit in the leg and could not walk. The Diwan Officer came (in July 1996) and told me that Hassan (one of Djamel Zitouni's epithets) was killed, as he fell in an ambush by the GIA's dissenters. Therefore, Antar Zouabri took over as Emir. At that period, individuals and groups began to break away from the GIA. Among the dissenters was Abu Khaled (Chouakri), who has been in Afghanistan, and Abu Lubaba, who was the bodyguard of Djamel Zitouni. Both broke away from the GIA. Abu Khaled had a good relationship with Sakhr al-Libi. Immediately after Abu Khaled broke away, Antar Zouabri followers went to Sakhr and tortured him severely (they plucked out a platinum rod that was implanted in his hand while he was still alive). Antar was not present during the torture session. He was at a remote center in al-Broakiya. He was with a battalion that was completely loyal to him. They forced Sakhr to make depositions, but I do not know what he told them.
Zouabri killed Radwan (Mcador) in 1997. Radwan was in the third year at the university when he joined the GIA. His brother Sofian was also killed in the mountain in a confrontation with the army in 1993 or 1994."
Salafists Invade Algiers - Part I
http://64.26.31.21:2010/Spec/06-2007/Article-20070606-00e20114-c0a8-10ed-01b1-6996c3e9266a/story.html
Algeria: Al-Qaeda Suffers from Differences Among its Leaders, 'Protectors of the Call' a group Holed up in the Mountain refusing to engage in Combat, Salafists Invade Algiers Capitalizing on the Security's Preoccupation with the Fight against Jihadists - Part I - (by Camille Tawil)
Camille Tawil Al-Hayat - 06/06/07//
Algiers - Fifteen years after the Algerian authorities cancelled the results of elections, which the Islamists were poised to sweep; Islamists have stepped back into the limelight today taking advantage of a large measure of freedom of religious activity granted by the authorities that are determined to turn over a new leaf with those willing to renounce violence.
Visitors of the Algerian capital notice a strong presence of Islamists from all walks of life, though the most noticeable are the Salafists with their long beards and short jilbab (garment). Such a scene was not not common a few years ago when the country was still fighting a war against militant groups in which no less than 150,000 have been killed.
Those people are not only spotted in one area of the capital, but they also appear in many of Algiers neighborhoods. They gather round mosques holding the hands of their children, who also wear Salafist-styled short jilbab like their fathers, and heading for prayers. You see them in taxis whose radios uninterruptedly pump out recitation of Qur'an. You can also see them in popular markets selling vegetables and meat.
But this 'Salafist rise' has not expressed itself during the elections Algeria witnessed a few days ago, as the Islamic parties that participated in the polls did not make a breakthrough at the expense of other political currents in the newly-elected National People's Assembly (the lower chamber of parliament).
Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) was the only party that made some progress, although it was largely attributed to the weakness of other parties (Movement for National Reform and the Islamic Renaissance Movement) not to the votes of the Salafists, who usually do not vote for a Brotherhood-oriented party.
Regardless of the elections and their results, some link the Salafist rise in Algeria to the tolerance shown by the authorities towards them in an effort to encourage the establishment of an Islamic alternative capable of confronting the Jihadists' ideologies. The Jihadists are the basic human reservoir on which the militant groups, which are bent on fighting the government, depend.
The Algerian authorities discovered the importance of the Salafists at the end of the 1990s at the advent of the new millennium when a number of Gulf scholars stated explicitly that what the militant groups in Algeria are doing is not jihad. Speaking to 'al-Hayat', a prominent official concerned with this dossier said that the fatwas of the Salafist scholars at the time were conveyed by special envoys to the warlords of militants groups in the mountains and had a considerable impact on those who "appeared as though they have suddenly discovered that what they thought right has turned out to be wrong and that the killings they have been doing over the years are not sanctioned by the Sharia, as they thought."
The official added that these fatwas, which provided a Sharia-based interpretation that nullifies jihad in Algeria, helped, in a very short period, convince a number of groups' warlords to get down from mountains and surrender in order to benefit from the 1999-2000 Civil Harmony Law, which was proposed at the beginning of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's term, and later from the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.
The official indicated that an Emir of a group descended from the mountain with all elements of his battalion and informed the security bodies that he had read the fatwas of the Salafist scholars and that he became convinced that he was mistaken and that he was ready to bear the consequences of his actions. The Emir confirmed that he did not descend from the mountain just out of his desire to benefit from the amnesty. The official did not reveal the name of the Emir or his group.
The official pointed out that the militant groups that are still in the mountain are divided into two main sections: the first is affiliated to the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb led by Abu Musab Abdel Wadud (Abdelmalik Droudkel) and the second is affiliated to the 'Protectors of the Salafist Call' group led by Salim al-Afghani.
Both groups are offshoots of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) following its disintegration in the second half of the 1990s as a result of the extremist ideology embraced by its leadership under Djamel Zitouni (between 1994 and 1996) and then Antar Zouabri (1996-2002). Under the leadership of Zouabri the GIA became a 'takfiri' group, considering Algerian society to be in violation of Islamic precepts.
While al-Qaeda (formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) is active in the wilayas (regions) on the eastern outskirts of the capital and some areas in the desert, the Protectors of the Salafist Call were taken the western region of Algiers as a base for its activity before being finally forced to move eastward across the Alonchris mountain chain toward the regions adjacent to the western part of the capital.
The official confirmed that Abdel Wadud's group - its members are estimated at few hundreds although its exact figure is not known - is suffering from intense internal problems due to the policy that has been adopted by Abdel Wadud since he converted the GSPC into al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb last January.
He said that penitent elements of this group have recently told the security services that many differences exist among its commanders, providing an accurate description of reservations expressed by some emirs at the policies of the National Emir, Abdel Wadud. It is known that al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb has recently issued a statement in which it denied Algerian reports about differences among its ranks, but the Algerian official told 'al-Hayat' that security services have information corroborating these differences.
The official pointed out that the authorities are still ready to reach out to any militant in the mountain, whether from Abdel Wadud's group or any other groups, urging him to lay down arms to take advantage of the reconciliation and peace charter (despite its expiry last year).
The official did not discuss in detail the position of the GSPC former Emir, Hassan Hattab, who refuses to come down from the mountain though he disagrees with GSPC-renamed-al-Qaeda current leaders. Nevertheless, the official praised Hattab's renunciation of militancy, assuming that the fatwas issued by the Salafist clerics in the Gulf invalidating jihad in Algeria could have made him review his ideas, although he was one of the first who defected from the GIA under the leadership of Antar Zouabri and disassociated themselves from the massacres it had claimed.
Hattab currently lives in an isolated place in a remote mountainous region, but he refuses to surrender to benefit from the reconciliation measures. Over the past few years security services have made contacts with him but they failed to reach agreement with him to come down from the mountain. It is believed that the security services are disappointed at Hattab's failure to convince a large number of GSPC activists to renounce violence and come out of their strongholds to benefit from the reconciliation law, while Hattab himself is cautious by nature and is afraid that the intelligence services are deceiving him. Therefore, he does not want to put 'all eggs in the basket of security bodies', because this will 'smear his reputation in the eyes of some Islamists'.
The official admitted it is difficult to completely eradicate al-Qaeda strongholds east of Algiers, but he said that the army knows that the elements of this organization are based in the upper parts of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou districts, but these bases are not fixed as the Salafists are forced to transfer them from one place to another as a result of security crackdown. The official explained that the Salafists' continuous movement hampers their ability to prepare for major operations, such as those carried out in the Algerian capital in April when they sent cars driven by suicide bombers that blew themselves up at the government palace and a security center in Bab Ezzouar.
The official emphasized that the current situation cannot be compared in any way with the situation in the 1990s, as today there is nothing called 'liberated areas' the army cannot enter, as was the case at the time of the Armed Islamic Group, which used to control well-fortified regions.
As for the Protectors of the Salafist Call, the second splinter group that broke away from the GIA, a source familiar with its dossier said that the fatwas of the Salafist clerics in the Gulf were also conveyed to its Emir 'Salim al-Afghani', who briefly replied without saying whether or not he is opposed to them.
It seems that this group decided to halt its operations without official announcement in a step similar to that taken by the leader of Egyptian Jihad group, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has ceased his operations in Egypt secretly since 1995-1996 for lack of capability, as the security forces dismantled most of his groups' structure inside the country.
The Algerian source told 'al-Hayat' that the army knows that elements of the Protectors of the Salafist Call avoid confrontation with it and begin to leave their positions in a particular area if they notice that the army approaches the area. Since the cessation of its operations years ago this group has been preparing a new generation of the sons of its elements and the people of the regions where they are deployed by indoctrinating them in the Salafist teachings.
A few days ago, the Algerian media received a letter signed by this group which included a Sharia-based interpretation confuting the justification for the bombings carried out by the al-Qaeda Organization in Algiers on the government palace and security center in Bab Ezzouar.
It is not clear today whether the Protectors of the Salafist Call's avoidance of military confrontation with the security forces is a temporary tactic strategy or a long-term strategy.
But it is believed that inside the Algerian military institution there are opponents to any compromise with this group on the ground that it takes advantage of the military cooling-off period to build its cells and capabilities and that confrontation with it is inevitable, if it is not today it will be tomorrow.
Others respond to this criticism by saying that the truce with the Salafists gives security bodies the time to focus on the Jihadists front, instead of fighting on two fronts.
(To be continued)
Algeria: Al-Qaeda Suffers from Differences Among its Leaders, 'Protectors of the Call' a group Holed up in the Mountain refusing to engage in Combat, Salafists Invade Algiers Capitalizing on the Security's Preoccupation with the Fight against Jihadists - Part I - (by Camille Tawil)
Camille Tawil Al-Hayat - 06/06/07//
Algiers - Fifteen years after the Algerian authorities cancelled the results of elections, which the Islamists were poised to sweep; Islamists have stepped back into the limelight today taking advantage of a large measure of freedom of religious activity granted by the authorities that are determined to turn over a new leaf with those willing to renounce violence.
Visitors of the Algerian capital notice a strong presence of Islamists from all walks of life, though the most noticeable are the Salafists with their long beards and short jilbab (garment). Such a scene was not not common a few years ago when the country was still fighting a war against militant groups in which no less than 150,000 have been killed.
Those people are not only spotted in one area of the capital, but they also appear in many of Algiers neighborhoods. They gather round mosques holding the hands of their children, who also wear Salafist-styled short jilbab like their fathers, and heading for prayers. You see them in taxis whose radios uninterruptedly pump out recitation of Qur'an. You can also see them in popular markets selling vegetables and meat.
But this 'Salafist rise' has not expressed itself during the elections Algeria witnessed a few days ago, as the Islamic parties that participated in the polls did not make a breakthrough at the expense of other political currents in the newly-elected National People's Assembly (the lower chamber of parliament).
Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) was the only party that made some progress, although it was largely attributed to the weakness of other parties (Movement for National Reform and the Islamic Renaissance Movement) not to the votes of the Salafists, who usually do not vote for a Brotherhood-oriented party.
Regardless of the elections and their results, some link the Salafist rise in Algeria to the tolerance shown by the authorities towards them in an effort to encourage the establishment of an Islamic alternative capable of confronting the Jihadists' ideologies. The Jihadists are the basic human reservoir on which the militant groups, which are bent on fighting the government, depend.
The Algerian authorities discovered the importance of the Salafists at the end of the 1990s at the advent of the new millennium when a number of Gulf scholars stated explicitly that what the militant groups in Algeria are doing is not jihad. Speaking to 'al-Hayat', a prominent official concerned with this dossier said that the fatwas of the Salafist scholars at the time were conveyed by special envoys to the warlords of militants groups in the mountains and had a considerable impact on those who "appeared as though they have suddenly discovered that what they thought right has turned out to be wrong and that the killings they have been doing over the years are not sanctioned by the Sharia, as they thought."
The official added that these fatwas, which provided a Sharia-based interpretation that nullifies jihad in Algeria, helped, in a very short period, convince a number of groups' warlords to get down from mountains and surrender in order to benefit from the 1999-2000 Civil Harmony Law, which was proposed at the beginning of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's term, and later from the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation.
The official indicated that an Emir of a group descended from the mountain with all elements of his battalion and informed the security bodies that he had read the fatwas of the Salafist scholars and that he became convinced that he was mistaken and that he was ready to bear the consequences of his actions. The Emir confirmed that he did not descend from the mountain just out of his desire to benefit from the amnesty. The official did not reveal the name of the Emir or his group.
The official pointed out that the militant groups that are still in the mountain are divided into two main sections: the first is affiliated to the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb led by Abu Musab Abdel Wadud (Abdelmalik Droudkel) and the second is affiliated to the 'Protectors of the Salafist Call' group led by Salim al-Afghani.
Both groups are offshoots of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) following its disintegration in the second half of the 1990s as a result of the extremist ideology embraced by its leadership under Djamel Zitouni (between 1994 and 1996) and then Antar Zouabri (1996-2002). Under the leadership of Zouabri the GIA became a 'takfiri' group, considering Algerian society to be in violation of Islamic precepts.
While al-Qaeda (formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) is active in the wilayas (regions) on the eastern outskirts of the capital and some areas in the desert, the Protectors of the Salafist Call were taken the western region of Algiers as a base for its activity before being finally forced to move eastward across the Alonchris mountain chain toward the regions adjacent to the western part of the capital.
The official confirmed that Abdel Wadud's group - its members are estimated at few hundreds although its exact figure is not known - is suffering from intense internal problems due to the policy that has been adopted by Abdel Wadud since he converted the GSPC into al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb last January.
He said that penitent elements of this group have recently told the security services that many differences exist among its commanders, providing an accurate description of reservations expressed by some emirs at the policies of the National Emir, Abdel Wadud. It is known that al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb has recently issued a statement in which it denied Algerian reports about differences among its ranks, but the Algerian official told 'al-Hayat' that security services have information corroborating these differences.
The official pointed out that the authorities are still ready to reach out to any militant in the mountain, whether from Abdel Wadud's group or any other groups, urging him to lay down arms to take advantage of the reconciliation and peace charter (despite its expiry last year).
The official did not discuss in detail the position of the GSPC former Emir, Hassan Hattab, who refuses to come down from the mountain though he disagrees with GSPC-renamed-al-Qaeda current leaders. Nevertheless, the official praised Hattab's renunciation of militancy, assuming that the fatwas issued by the Salafist clerics in the Gulf invalidating jihad in Algeria could have made him review his ideas, although he was one of the first who defected from the GIA under the leadership of Antar Zouabri and disassociated themselves from the massacres it had claimed.
Hattab currently lives in an isolated place in a remote mountainous region, but he refuses to surrender to benefit from the reconciliation measures. Over the past few years security services have made contacts with him but they failed to reach agreement with him to come down from the mountain. It is believed that the security services are disappointed at Hattab's failure to convince a large number of GSPC activists to renounce violence and come out of their strongholds to benefit from the reconciliation law, while Hattab himself is cautious by nature and is afraid that the intelligence services are deceiving him. Therefore, he does not want to put 'all eggs in the basket of security bodies', because this will 'smear his reputation in the eyes of some Islamists'.
The official admitted it is difficult to completely eradicate al-Qaeda strongholds east of Algiers, but he said that the army knows that the elements of this organization are based in the upper parts of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou districts, but these bases are not fixed as the Salafists are forced to transfer them from one place to another as a result of security crackdown. The official explained that the Salafists' continuous movement hampers their ability to prepare for major operations, such as those carried out in the Algerian capital in April when they sent cars driven by suicide bombers that blew themselves up at the government palace and a security center in Bab Ezzouar.
The official emphasized that the current situation cannot be compared in any way with the situation in the 1990s, as today there is nothing called 'liberated areas' the army cannot enter, as was the case at the time of the Armed Islamic Group, which used to control well-fortified regions.
As for the Protectors of the Salafist Call, the second splinter group that broke away from the GIA, a source familiar with its dossier said that the fatwas of the Salafist clerics in the Gulf were also conveyed to its Emir 'Salim al-Afghani', who briefly replied without saying whether or not he is opposed to them.
It seems that this group decided to halt its operations without official announcement in a step similar to that taken by the leader of Egyptian Jihad group, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has ceased his operations in Egypt secretly since 1995-1996 for lack of capability, as the security forces dismantled most of his groups' structure inside the country.
The Algerian source told 'al-Hayat' that the army knows that elements of the Protectors of the Salafist Call avoid confrontation with it and begin to leave their positions in a particular area if they notice that the army approaches the area. Since the cessation of its operations years ago this group has been preparing a new generation of the sons of its elements and the people of the regions where they are deployed by indoctrinating them in the Salafist teachings.
A few days ago, the Algerian media received a letter signed by this group which included a Sharia-based interpretation confuting the justification for the bombings carried out by the al-Qaeda Organization in Algiers on the government palace and security center in Bab Ezzouar.
It is not clear today whether the Protectors of the Salafist Call's avoidance of military confrontation with the security forces is a temporary tactic strategy or a long-term strategy.
But it is believed that inside the Algerian military institution there are opponents to any compromise with this group on the ground that it takes advantage of the military cooling-off period to build its cells and capabilities and that confrontation with it is inevitable, if it is not today it will be tomorrow.
Others respond to this criticism by saying that the truce with the Salafists gives security bodies the time to focus on the Jihadists front, instead of fighting on two fronts.
(To be continued)
Camille Al-Tawil's book Al-Qaeda wa Akhawatuha: Kissat Al-Jihadyieen Al-Arab
http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/OPED/10-2007/Article-20071016-a8cc9f4e-c0a8-10ed-00c3-e8c4ce0ff3c1/story.html
Ayoon Wa Azan (One Should Not Mix Up The Good With The Bad)
Jihad el-Khazen Al-Hayat - 16/10/07//
Today I have for my readers a collection of books some of which I have read and hope to read some others, in addition to books that I will not read. Yet, they remain important since one should be aware of their existence. When the author is an enemy or a famous racist, I do not need to hear his view on Hizbullah or Hamas or any other Arab or Islamic country.
Some western writers are fairer than us and more sympathetic to Arab and Islamic causes than some of those concerned. Therefore, one should not mix up the good with the bad ones as this will promote the opponent's argument and weaken the friend's attitude.
The number of books dealing with Hamas has increased since its victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006. Such books will inevitably increase another time in the aftermath of its dissociation of the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian national authorities in Ramallah.
I will not try to compare the books as I have read only Inside Hamas: the Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies by colleague Zaki Shihab. The other available books mirror a prejudiced opinion. Fellow Azzam Al-Tamimi published his book Hamas: Unwritten Chapters but I know that he sympathizes with Hamas and all Islamic factions.
Matthew Levitt also published Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. However, this man is a radical Israeli apologist whose work at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy I have followed up and consequently I have found him a vile and racist man. He collects death toll figures resulting from Hamas' suicide attacks and has come up with 473 killed in 79 operations. But he overlooks Israel's massacre of 4233 Palestinians almost in the same period. This figure involves 857 minors some of whom are girls below adolescence age and children, and it seems that he does not consider them humans such as the Israelis like him. I oppose suicide operations, though I have not heard yet that Lewitt opposes Israeli Nazism.
Leaving Lewitt to be eaten up by his grudges, I go back to Zaki Shihab who knows Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the Hamas spiritual father and the handicapped scholar whose son Abdel Hamid is tortured by the Israelis in front of him to force him to concede his role in the creation of Hamas. He is also expected to deliver the names of the founding members, some of whom are martyrs while others are still alive and have become ministers. Zaki Shihab had conducted several long interviews with Sheikh Yassin and Alhayat published some of them. He enriched the book with other details and provided new information on other Hamas leaders as he knows them personally and maintains contact with them.
If the subject of interest is not Hamas, it must be Hizbullah on which many books have been published. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy is almost an expert in funding both factions and in warning against them on behalf of Israel. The specialized researcher is interested in such books, but I resist buying them to prevent both the author and the publisher from reaping any benefit.
Camille Al-Tawil's book Al-Qaeda wa Akhawatuha: Kissat Al-Jihadyieen Al-Arab, published by Saqi Publishers, has been the best work on the topic in the past ten years. Unfortunately it is written in Arabic and westerners, especially the Americans, are in greater need of the information mentioned in it than we are. One of the causes behind the calamities befalling the Americans in Afghanistan, Iraq and everywhere is the presence of alleged terror experts, the majority of whom work according to an Israeli agenda, and their awareness of the topic is restricted to what suits their commitment to Israel.
Camille Al-Tawil is a senior editor in Al-Hayat in the Islamists' section and he is familiar with them from Algeria to Afghanistan and Pakistan and every country in the region. He has now produced out of his experience a 412-page book in which the index on major figures is made up of ten pages.
In the introduction, Camille says that the jihadists initially considered the jihad against apostate rulers a priority. But after the Americans hit them in Afghanistan toward the end of 2001 and early 2002, they turned to fighting 'the original unbelievers', i.e. western rulers on top of whom is the United States. Yet, in the author's opinion, the transformation is for a temporary and specific reason having to do with the fact that the unbelievers are behind the persistence of the apostates in ruling the Islamic world, and once the unbelievers are defeated the apostates will collapse with them. The author chooses to review the history of the jihad group in Egypt, The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. As a colleague of Camille, I know that his information comes from direct sources and it is accumulated over a number of years. Explaining his choice, he says that Al-Qaeda's history can not be narrated independently of that of its sister jihadist groups, the majority of whom emerged following the period of jihad in Afghanistan toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s of last century.
If the reader can not read more than one book on jihadists, he will find his long-sought object in Al-Qaeda wa Akhawatuha. The pages on the Islamists' activities in the Sudan, too informative for the Bashir government to tolerate, represent a treasure of information on that period. Similarly, Osama Bin Laden's return to Afghanistan after he had spent years in the Sudan accurately chronicles that period. The book also deals with the rivalry between the incoming Arab groups and between the Afghan mujahideen, alliances and conspiracies, the roles played by prominent leaders and others known only by insiders.
I hope that Camille Al-Tawil's book will be translated into English, and I also hope that the American administration officials will read it so they can find, at least once, true information that might help them take right decisions, at least one. I will get back to new books in two days' time.
http://www.j-khazen.blogspot.com/
Ayoon Wa Azan (One Should Not Mix Up The Good With The Bad)
Jihad el-Khazen Al-Hayat - 16/10/07//
Today I have for my readers a collection of books some of which I have read and hope to read some others, in addition to books that I will not read. Yet, they remain important since one should be aware of their existence. When the author is an enemy or a famous racist, I do not need to hear his view on Hizbullah or Hamas or any other Arab or Islamic country.
Some western writers are fairer than us and more sympathetic to Arab and Islamic causes than some of those concerned. Therefore, one should not mix up the good with the bad ones as this will promote the opponent's argument and weaken the friend's attitude.
The number of books dealing with Hamas has increased since its victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006. Such books will inevitably increase another time in the aftermath of its dissociation of the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian national authorities in Ramallah.
I will not try to compare the books as I have read only Inside Hamas: the Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies by colleague Zaki Shihab. The other available books mirror a prejudiced opinion. Fellow Azzam Al-Tamimi published his book Hamas: Unwritten Chapters but I know that he sympathizes with Hamas and all Islamic factions.
Matthew Levitt also published Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad. However, this man is a radical Israeli apologist whose work at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy I have followed up and consequently I have found him a vile and racist man. He collects death toll figures resulting from Hamas' suicide attacks and has come up with 473 killed in 79 operations. But he overlooks Israel's massacre of 4233 Palestinians almost in the same period. This figure involves 857 minors some of whom are girls below adolescence age and children, and it seems that he does not consider them humans such as the Israelis like him. I oppose suicide operations, though I have not heard yet that Lewitt opposes Israeli Nazism.
Leaving Lewitt to be eaten up by his grudges, I go back to Zaki Shihab who knows Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the Hamas spiritual father and the handicapped scholar whose son Abdel Hamid is tortured by the Israelis in front of him to force him to concede his role in the creation of Hamas. He is also expected to deliver the names of the founding members, some of whom are martyrs while others are still alive and have become ministers. Zaki Shihab had conducted several long interviews with Sheikh Yassin and Alhayat published some of them. He enriched the book with other details and provided new information on other Hamas leaders as he knows them personally and maintains contact with them.
If the subject of interest is not Hamas, it must be Hizbullah on which many books have been published. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy is almost an expert in funding both factions and in warning against them on behalf of Israel. The specialized researcher is interested in such books, but I resist buying them to prevent both the author and the publisher from reaping any benefit.
Camille Al-Tawil's book Al-Qaeda wa Akhawatuha: Kissat Al-Jihadyieen Al-Arab, published by Saqi Publishers, has been the best work on the topic in the past ten years. Unfortunately it is written in Arabic and westerners, especially the Americans, are in greater need of the information mentioned in it than we are. One of the causes behind the calamities befalling the Americans in Afghanistan, Iraq and everywhere is the presence of alleged terror experts, the majority of whom work according to an Israeli agenda, and their awareness of the topic is restricted to what suits their commitment to Israel.
Camille Al-Tawil is a senior editor in Al-Hayat in the Islamists' section and he is familiar with them from Algeria to Afghanistan and Pakistan and every country in the region. He has now produced out of his experience a 412-page book in which the index on major figures is made up of ten pages.
In the introduction, Camille says that the jihadists initially considered the jihad against apostate rulers a priority. But after the Americans hit them in Afghanistan toward the end of 2001 and early 2002, they turned to fighting 'the original unbelievers', i.e. western rulers on top of whom is the United States. Yet, in the author's opinion, the transformation is for a temporary and specific reason having to do with the fact that the unbelievers are behind the persistence of the apostates in ruling the Islamic world, and once the unbelievers are defeated the apostates will collapse with them. The author chooses to review the history of the jihad group in Egypt, The Armed Islamic Group in Algeria, and The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. As a colleague of Camille, I know that his information comes from direct sources and it is accumulated over a number of years. Explaining his choice, he says that Al-Qaeda's history can not be narrated independently of that of its sister jihadist groups, the majority of whom emerged following the period of jihad in Afghanistan toward the end of the 1980s and early 1990s of last century.
If the reader can not read more than one book on jihadists, he will find his long-sought object in Al-Qaeda wa Akhawatuha. The pages on the Islamists' activities in the Sudan, too informative for the Bashir government to tolerate, represent a treasure of information on that period. Similarly, Osama Bin Laden's return to Afghanistan after he had spent years in the Sudan accurately chronicles that period. The book also deals with the rivalry between the incoming Arab groups and between the Afghan mujahideen, alliances and conspiracies, the roles played by prominent leaders and others known only by insiders.
I hope that Camille Al-Tawil's book will be translated into English, and I also hope that the American administration officials will read it so they can find, at least once, true information that might help them take right decisions, at least one. I will get back to new books in two days' time.
http://www.j-khazen.blogspot.com/
Sunday, 21 October 2007
annahar - aarabiah
http://channels.aarabiah.net/2007/10/12/27092.html
كميل الطويل يروي قصة بن لادن والجهاديين العرب
صدر مؤخرا عن دار الساقي كتاب "القاعدة وأخواتها، قصة الجهاديين العرب" لمؤلفه كميل الطويل.
يرصد الكتاب أهم مراحل تطور تنظيم القاعدة إلى جانب الجماعات الإرهابية الجهادية القريبة منها منهاجاً وعملاً، والتي تمثل محور الحرب ضد الإرهاب التي تخوضها الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، مركّزاً على جماعات "الجهاد" في ثلاث دول عربية، كون تجاربها ساهمت في تكوين "القاعدة" في صورتها الحالية، صورة تقديم قتال الأميركيين "الكفار" أينما وجدوا، على قتال "المرتدّين" في الدول العربية. هذه الجماعات هي "جماعة الجهاد" في مصر، "الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة" في الجزائر، و"الجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة" في ليبيا.
تأسست "القاعدة" في نهاية الثمانينات في أفغانستان وتحديداً عام 1988، بعدما لاحظ أسامة بن لادن أن حركة المجاهدين العرب، قدوماً وذهاباً والتحاقاً بالجبهات، بل وحتى كثرة الإصابات والإستشهادات، قد ازدادت، من دون أن يكون لديه سجل بهذه الحركة رغم أهميتها.
ووفقا لميلود بن غربي بجريدة "النهار" اللبنانية، ما كاد الجهاديون العرب يصلون إلى أفغانستان بأعدادهم الكبيرة في نهاية الثمانينات حتى وجدوا أن الجهاد الذي جاؤوا من أجله انتهى أو شارف الإنتهاء. ومع إنسحاب الجيش الأحمر في شباط 1989، أرغم الأفغان العرب الذين باتوا يعدّون بالآلاف، بعدما كان عددهم لا يتجاوز الـ15 في 1984، على التفكير في وجهتهم الآتية. وفي طبيعة الحال كانوا يعرفون أن جهادهم في أفغانستان سينتهي في أحد الأيام وسيعودون. إلا أن صورة ما سيحصل بعد انتهاء هذا الجهاد لم تكن بالوضوح ذاته لدى جميع الأفغان العرب، هل يعودون فقط إلـى بلدانهم وحياتهـم الطبيعيـة كأن شيئاً لم يحدث؟ أم يواصلون هذا "الجهاد" المسلح؟ وإذا واصلوه فضدّ من؟.
ويعتقد المؤلف أن مفهوم "ما بعد الجهاد الأفغاني" اختلف بين "الأفغان العرب"، فبعضهم، وتحديداً الحركيين المنتسبين إلى جماعات جهادية قبل مجيئهم إلى أفغانستان، كان يعرف أنه جاء للتحضير لمعركته المقبلة مع أنظمة الحكم في بلده، وكان في مقدّم هؤلاء المصريون من أفراد "الجماعة الإسلامية" و"جماعة الجهاد". فهذان التنظيمان، لم يكونا في حاجة إلى بناء مناهجهما وهياكلهما من الصفر، فالمناهج كانت موجودة أصلاً في كتب سيد قطب ومحمد عبد السلام فرج، أما الكوادر فهي أيضاً كانت متوافرة بعدما أفرجت السلطات المصرية عن مئات من أعضاء تنظيمي "الجهاد" و"الجماعة" المدانين في قضية إغتيال الرئيس الراحل أنور السادات.
استطاع هؤلاء شق طريقهم إلى ساحات الجهاد الأفغاني في نهاية الثمانينات، وكان في مقدمهم بالطبع أيمن الظواهري الذي خرج من سجون بلاده أكثر تصميماً على مواصلة "الجهاد" لإسقاط نظام الحكم فيها. وشهدت مصر بالفعل حوادث دموية مماثلة لتلك التي عرفتها الجزائر في الفترة نفسها، وإن بنسبة أقل، فقد خاض هؤلاء الجهاديون مع قوات الأمن المصرية معارك واغتيالات وهجمات على السياح الأجانب طوال النصف الأول من سبعينات القرن الماضي.
يقول المؤلف إن السودان لعب دوراً محورياً في أوائل التسعينات للجماعات الإسلامية العربية المعارضة لأنظمة الحكم الفاسدة. فسياسة الأبواب المفتوحة للاسلاميين التي اعتمدها نظام حكم الرئيس عمر البشير وحليفه السابق حسن الترابي، في مطلع التسعينات، جعلت الخرطوم في فترة وجيزة خلية تضطلع بدور شبيه بدور بيشاور الباكستانية في أيام الجهاد الأفغاني.
أمضى أسامة بن لادن في السودان فترة من أهم الفترات في حياته بعدما توجه إليها عام 1991، إذ استطاع هناك مواصلة اعداد مقاتليه إعداداً عسكرياً في مزارع كان يديرها في مناطق سودانية عدة، كما أتاح له وجوده هناك وعلاقته مع كبار المسؤولين السياسيين والأمنيين البقاء قريباً مما كان يجري في المنطقة.
تغير موقف السودانيين من "الأفغان العرب" ولكن بعد فوات الأوان، فقد غادر أسامة بن لادن السودان في عملية سرية على متن طائرة خاصة أقلته مع عدد من أتباعه من الخرطوم إلى جلال أباد، وما ان وصل إلى أفغانستان حتى بادر إلى توجيه رسائل إلى قادة الفصائل الأفغانية كرر فيها إلتزامه عدم الدخول في صراعاتهم.
وحينما زحفت قوات "طالبان" من معقلها في قندهار وبدأت المدن الأفغانية تتساقط واحدة تلو الأخرى، ومنها جلال أباد حيث كان يعيش أسامة وأنصاره في يوليو 1996 قبل شهرين من دخول "طالبان" إلى كابول، لم يتغير وضع أسامة بن لادن بل بقي ضيفاً مكرماً وإن أضحى يعيش في ما بعد في كهف هو ومن معه.
كميل الطويل يروي قصة بن لادن والجهاديين العرب
صدر مؤخرا عن دار الساقي كتاب "القاعدة وأخواتها، قصة الجهاديين العرب" لمؤلفه كميل الطويل.
يرصد الكتاب أهم مراحل تطور تنظيم القاعدة إلى جانب الجماعات الإرهابية الجهادية القريبة منها منهاجاً وعملاً، والتي تمثل محور الحرب ضد الإرهاب التي تخوضها الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، مركّزاً على جماعات "الجهاد" في ثلاث دول عربية، كون تجاربها ساهمت في تكوين "القاعدة" في صورتها الحالية، صورة تقديم قتال الأميركيين "الكفار" أينما وجدوا، على قتال "المرتدّين" في الدول العربية. هذه الجماعات هي "جماعة الجهاد" في مصر، "الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة" في الجزائر، و"الجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة" في ليبيا.
تأسست "القاعدة" في نهاية الثمانينات في أفغانستان وتحديداً عام 1988، بعدما لاحظ أسامة بن لادن أن حركة المجاهدين العرب، قدوماً وذهاباً والتحاقاً بالجبهات، بل وحتى كثرة الإصابات والإستشهادات، قد ازدادت، من دون أن يكون لديه سجل بهذه الحركة رغم أهميتها.
ووفقا لميلود بن غربي بجريدة "النهار" اللبنانية، ما كاد الجهاديون العرب يصلون إلى أفغانستان بأعدادهم الكبيرة في نهاية الثمانينات حتى وجدوا أن الجهاد الذي جاؤوا من أجله انتهى أو شارف الإنتهاء. ومع إنسحاب الجيش الأحمر في شباط 1989، أرغم الأفغان العرب الذين باتوا يعدّون بالآلاف، بعدما كان عددهم لا يتجاوز الـ15 في 1984، على التفكير في وجهتهم الآتية. وفي طبيعة الحال كانوا يعرفون أن جهادهم في أفغانستان سينتهي في أحد الأيام وسيعودون. إلا أن صورة ما سيحصل بعد انتهاء هذا الجهاد لم تكن بالوضوح ذاته لدى جميع الأفغان العرب، هل يعودون فقط إلـى بلدانهم وحياتهـم الطبيعيـة كأن شيئاً لم يحدث؟ أم يواصلون هذا "الجهاد" المسلح؟ وإذا واصلوه فضدّ من؟.
ويعتقد المؤلف أن مفهوم "ما بعد الجهاد الأفغاني" اختلف بين "الأفغان العرب"، فبعضهم، وتحديداً الحركيين المنتسبين إلى جماعات جهادية قبل مجيئهم إلى أفغانستان، كان يعرف أنه جاء للتحضير لمعركته المقبلة مع أنظمة الحكم في بلده، وكان في مقدّم هؤلاء المصريون من أفراد "الجماعة الإسلامية" و"جماعة الجهاد". فهذان التنظيمان، لم يكونا في حاجة إلى بناء مناهجهما وهياكلهما من الصفر، فالمناهج كانت موجودة أصلاً في كتب سيد قطب ومحمد عبد السلام فرج، أما الكوادر فهي أيضاً كانت متوافرة بعدما أفرجت السلطات المصرية عن مئات من أعضاء تنظيمي "الجهاد" و"الجماعة" المدانين في قضية إغتيال الرئيس الراحل أنور السادات.
استطاع هؤلاء شق طريقهم إلى ساحات الجهاد الأفغاني في نهاية الثمانينات، وكان في مقدمهم بالطبع أيمن الظواهري الذي خرج من سجون بلاده أكثر تصميماً على مواصلة "الجهاد" لإسقاط نظام الحكم فيها. وشهدت مصر بالفعل حوادث دموية مماثلة لتلك التي عرفتها الجزائر في الفترة نفسها، وإن بنسبة أقل، فقد خاض هؤلاء الجهاديون مع قوات الأمن المصرية معارك واغتيالات وهجمات على السياح الأجانب طوال النصف الأول من سبعينات القرن الماضي.
يقول المؤلف إن السودان لعب دوراً محورياً في أوائل التسعينات للجماعات الإسلامية العربية المعارضة لأنظمة الحكم الفاسدة. فسياسة الأبواب المفتوحة للاسلاميين التي اعتمدها نظام حكم الرئيس عمر البشير وحليفه السابق حسن الترابي، في مطلع التسعينات، جعلت الخرطوم في فترة وجيزة خلية تضطلع بدور شبيه بدور بيشاور الباكستانية في أيام الجهاد الأفغاني.
أمضى أسامة بن لادن في السودان فترة من أهم الفترات في حياته بعدما توجه إليها عام 1991، إذ استطاع هناك مواصلة اعداد مقاتليه إعداداً عسكرياً في مزارع كان يديرها في مناطق سودانية عدة، كما أتاح له وجوده هناك وعلاقته مع كبار المسؤولين السياسيين والأمنيين البقاء قريباً مما كان يجري في المنطقة.
تغير موقف السودانيين من "الأفغان العرب" ولكن بعد فوات الأوان، فقد غادر أسامة بن لادن السودان في عملية سرية على متن طائرة خاصة أقلته مع عدد من أتباعه من الخرطوم إلى جلال أباد، وما ان وصل إلى أفغانستان حتى بادر إلى توجيه رسائل إلى قادة الفصائل الأفغانية كرر فيها إلتزامه عدم الدخول في صراعاتهم.
وحينما زحفت قوات "طالبان" من معقلها في قندهار وبدأت المدن الأفغانية تتساقط واحدة تلو الأخرى، ومنها جلال أباد حيث كان يعيش أسامة وأنصاره في يوليو 1996 قبل شهرين من دخول "طالبان" إلى كابول، لم يتغير وضع أسامة بن لادن بل بقي ضيفاً مكرماً وإن أضحى يعيش في ما بعد في كهف هو ومن معه.
Al-Akhbar Newspaper on Al-Qaeda's book
http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/48966
شجرة العائلة لتنظيم القاعدة
فداء عيتاني
نقص سرديّ وعمق في الرصد
يراكم كميل الطويل رواياته على لسان أبطالها الأصليين، ليؤلف مشهد «أخوات القاعدة» قبل وصف القاعدة وصعود نجمها وعملياتها، في كتابه الجديد «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب»، الصادر عن دار الساقي.
ويذهب الطويل في رحلة أرشيفية تاريخية، يُخرج خلالها ما تراكم من ملفات ومقابلات لديه، خلال عمله على الحركات الإسلامية في جريدة «الحياة»، ورحلاته التي قادته إلى العديد من العواصم، ولقاءاته مع مختلف قيادات المجموعات الإسلامية، من الجزائرية وصولاً إلى مختلف الأفغان العائدين.
وبعد كتابه «الحركات الإسلامية المسلحة في الجزائر»، الصادر عام 1998، الذي يعدّ أحد المراجع الرئيسية في تاريخ الحركات الجزائرية، يتجه الطويل نحو تكريس دوره كأحد مؤرخي الحركات الجهادية في كتابه الجديد. ويفرض كتابه ضرورة لأي مهتم بالملف الجهادي، أو أي متابع له، وممراً إجبارياً للقرّاء المختصين، دون أن يتدخل الكاتب في الكثير من المواقع في نص الكتاب، تاركاً التاريخ يسرد نفسه على لسان أبطاله.
ويتخصص الكتاب في سرد تاريخ الحركات التالية: «جماعة الجهاد» المصرية، «الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة» الجزائرية، «الجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة» الليبية. ويستعرض تاريخ علاقاتها مع الجماعات الإسلامية المختلفة في محيطها الحيوي. وهو ينطلق تاريخياً من بدايات الجهاد العربي في أفغانستان عام 1979، وينتهي في الأعوام الأخيرة التالية على غزوة مانهاتن، ويتابع أدق التفاصيل في العلاقات القائمة بين هذه المجموعات وبين التنظيمات الأخرى، وخاصة القاعدة، منتقلاً في سرده ما بين أفغانستان وليبيا والجزائر واليمن ومصر والسودان، وصولاً إلى إشارة سريعة ومقتضبة إلى لبنان.
ويتحفّظ الكاتب (وهو أمر مفهوم) عن ذكر عدد من مصادره وبعض معلوماته، فيما يورد الأحاديث التي أجراها مع قادة في الحركات الإسلامية في ليبيا ومصر والجزائر، إضافة إلى عدد من الأمنيين في الدول المعنية بحلقات الجهاد ومحاكمات المجاهدين. وعلى سبيل المثال لا الحصر، يورد الكاتب لقاءاته مع نعمان بن عثمان وعبد الناصر الجراري من ليبيا، وعبد الله أنس من الجزائر وهاني السباعي من مصر، وعصام دراز ضابط المخابرات المصري، كما يسرد تفاصيل من محاكمات لجهاديين في دول عربية وغربية خاصة، حضرها بنفسه.
ويؤسس الكتاب لفهم تاريخية الحركات الجهادية الأكثر قرباً من تنظيم القاعدة، ورؤية الخلافات بين هذه التنظيمات وبين تنظيمات أخرى ابتعدت عن التحالف مع تنظيم القاعدة، ضمن ما سيُعرف ابتداءً من عام 1998 بـ«الجبهة الإسلامية العالمية لجهاد اليهود والصليبيين»، التي تعرف اليوم باسم مكوّنها الأقوى «تنظيم القاعدة».
وعلى أهمية إيراد النصوص الأساسية للمقابلات التي أجراها الكاتب مع القادة الجهاديين في مختلف أصقاع العالم، إلا أن النص ككل يفتقد إلى سياق ووجهة نظر تحليلية لكل ما جرى تجميعه من مواد ومعطيات ومعلومات حساسة. وإن كان ذلك لا ينقص من أهمية الكتاب، إلا أنه يحوّله إلى مرجع ومادة خام للدارسين والمتابعين، أكثر منه «قصة الجهاديين العرب». اللهمّ الا إذا اعتبرنا أن ما يرويه الجهاديون أنفسهم هو القصة. لا بد من الإقرار للكاتب بحسن المتابعة والعمق في البحث عن أصول وتطور الحركات الإسلامية الجهادية التي استهدفها في نصه، وخاصة تحقيق النص لهدفه الذي يوجزه الكاتب في مقدّمته: رصد تطوّر ثلاث حركات جهادية في ثلاث دول عربية، وإسهام تجاربها في تكوين «القاعدة» بصورتها الحالية. وبهذا المعنى، فإنّ الكتاب مرجع لأخصّائيين ووثيقة قائمة بذاتها، يمكن الركون إليها والاعتماد عليها في أيّ عمل مستقبلي يحاول التعمّق في الحركات الجهادية في الدول المعنية، وليس فقط في الحركات الرئيسية الثلاث التي يستهدفها الكتاب بخاصة.
* من أسرة الأخبار
العنوان الأصلي
القاعدة
وأخواتها: قصّة الجهاديّين العرب
الكاتب:
كميل الطويل
الناشر
دار الساقي
عدد الاربعاء ٣ تشرين الأول
شجرة العائلة لتنظيم القاعدة
فداء عيتاني
نقص سرديّ وعمق في الرصد
يراكم كميل الطويل رواياته على لسان أبطالها الأصليين، ليؤلف مشهد «أخوات القاعدة» قبل وصف القاعدة وصعود نجمها وعملياتها، في كتابه الجديد «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب»، الصادر عن دار الساقي.
ويذهب الطويل في رحلة أرشيفية تاريخية، يُخرج خلالها ما تراكم من ملفات ومقابلات لديه، خلال عمله على الحركات الإسلامية في جريدة «الحياة»، ورحلاته التي قادته إلى العديد من العواصم، ولقاءاته مع مختلف قيادات المجموعات الإسلامية، من الجزائرية وصولاً إلى مختلف الأفغان العائدين.
وبعد كتابه «الحركات الإسلامية المسلحة في الجزائر»، الصادر عام 1998، الذي يعدّ أحد المراجع الرئيسية في تاريخ الحركات الجزائرية، يتجه الطويل نحو تكريس دوره كأحد مؤرخي الحركات الجهادية في كتابه الجديد. ويفرض كتابه ضرورة لأي مهتم بالملف الجهادي، أو أي متابع له، وممراً إجبارياً للقرّاء المختصين، دون أن يتدخل الكاتب في الكثير من المواقع في نص الكتاب، تاركاً التاريخ يسرد نفسه على لسان أبطاله.
ويتخصص الكتاب في سرد تاريخ الحركات التالية: «جماعة الجهاد» المصرية، «الجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة» الجزائرية، «الجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة» الليبية. ويستعرض تاريخ علاقاتها مع الجماعات الإسلامية المختلفة في محيطها الحيوي. وهو ينطلق تاريخياً من بدايات الجهاد العربي في أفغانستان عام 1979، وينتهي في الأعوام الأخيرة التالية على غزوة مانهاتن، ويتابع أدق التفاصيل في العلاقات القائمة بين هذه المجموعات وبين التنظيمات الأخرى، وخاصة القاعدة، منتقلاً في سرده ما بين أفغانستان وليبيا والجزائر واليمن ومصر والسودان، وصولاً إلى إشارة سريعة ومقتضبة إلى لبنان.
ويتحفّظ الكاتب (وهو أمر مفهوم) عن ذكر عدد من مصادره وبعض معلوماته، فيما يورد الأحاديث التي أجراها مع قادة في الحركات الإسلامية في ليبيا ومصر والجزائر، إضافة إلى عدد من الأمنيين في الدول المعنية بحلقات الجهاد ومحاكمات المجاهدين. وعلى سبيل المثال لا الحصر، يورد الكاتب لقاءاته مع نعمان بن عثمان وعبد الناصر الجراري من ليبيا، وعبد الله أنس من الجزائر وهاني السباعي من مصر، وعصام دراز ضابط المخابرات المصري، كما يسرد تفاصيل من محاكمات لجهاديين في دول عربية وغربية خاصة، حضرها بنفسه.
ويؤسس الكتاب لفهم تاريخية الحركات الجهادية الأكثر قرباً من تنظيم القاعدة، ورؤية الخلافات بين هذه التنظيمات وبين تنظيمات أخرى ابتعدت عن التحالف مع تنظيم القاعدة، ضمن ما سيُعرف ابتداءً من عام 1998 بـ«الجبهة الإسلامية العالمية لجهاد اليهود والصليبيين»، التي تعرف اليوم باسم مكوّنها الأقوى «تنظيم القاعدة».
وعلى أهمية إيراد النصوص الأساسية للمقابلات التي أجراها الكاتب مع القادة الجهاديين في مختلف أصقاع العالم، إلا أن النص ككل يفتقد إلى سياق ووجهة نظر تحليلية لكل ما جرى تجميعه من مواد ومعطيات ومعلومات حساسة. وإن كان ذلك لا ينقص من أهمية الكتاب، إلا أنه يحوّله إلى مرجع ومادة خام للدارسين والمتابعين، أكثر منه «قصة الجهاديين العرب». اللهمّ الا إذا اعتبرنا أن ما يرويه الجهاديون أنفسهم هو القصة. لا بد من الإقرار للكاتب بحسن المتابعة والعمق في البحث عن أصول وتطور الحركات الإسلامية الجهادية التي استهدفها في نصه، وخاصة تحقيق النص لهدفه الذي يوجزه الكاتب في مقدّمته: رصد تطوّر ثلاث حركات جهادية في ثلاث دول عربية، وإسهام تجاربها في تكوين «القاعدة» بصورتها الحالية. وبهذا المعنى، فإنّ الكتاب مرجع لأخصّائيين ووثيقة قائمة بذاتها، يمكن الركون إليها والاعتماد عليها في أيّ عمل مستقبلي يحاول التعمّق في الحركات الجهادية في الدول المعنية، وليس فقط في الحركات الرئيسية الثلاث التي يستهدفها الكتاب بخاصة.
* من أسرة الأخبار
العنوان الأصلي
القاعدة
وأخواتها: قصّة الجهاديّين العرب
الكاتب:
كميل الطويل
الناشر
دار الساقي
عدد الاربعاء ٣ تشرين الأول
Al-Hayat Newspaper
http://www.daralhayat.com/opinion/editorials/10-2007/Item-20071015-a4d49e61-c0a8-10ed-00c3-e8c415097e66/story.html
عيون واذان (خلط الصالح بالطالح)
جهاد الخازن Manually created - 15/10/07//
عندي للقارئ اليوم وغداً مجموعة من الكتب قرأت بعضها، وأرجو أن أقرأ بعضاً آخر، ومعها كتب لن أقرأها، إلا أنها تظل مهمة من باب العلم بالشيء، فعندما يكون المؤلف عنصرياً معروفاً أو عدواً لا أحتاج أن أسمع رأيه في حزب الله أو حماس، أو أي بلد عربي أو إسلامي.
أقول هذا ثم أشدد على أن بعض الكتّاب الغربيين أكثر إنصافاً منا، وأكثر تعاطفاً مع قضايا العرب والمسلمين من بعض أهلها، لذلك لا يجوز أبداً خلط الصالح بالطالح، لأن الخلط يثبت حجة الخصم، ويضعف موقف الصديق.
هناك كتب عدة عن حماس زادت منذ فوزها بالانتخابات البرلمانية الفلسطينية في كانون الثاني (يناير) من السنة الماضية، ولا بد من أن تزيد مرة ثانية بعد انفصالها في قطاع غزة عن السلطة الوطنية في رام الله.
لن أحاول أن أفاضل بين الكتب، لأنني لم أقرأ منها سوى كتاب «داخل حماس» للزميل زكي شهاب، ثم أن الكتب الأخرى المتوافرة تعكس موقفاً مسبقاً، فالأخ عزّام التميم صدر له «حماس: فصول لم تكتب»، إلا أنني أعرف انه متعاطف مع حماس والفصائل الإسلامية كافة. وماثيو ليفيت صدر له «حماس: سياسة وأعمال خيرية وإرهاب في خدمة الجهاد»، إلا أن هذا الرجل اعتذاري اسرائيلي متطرف، تابعت عمله في معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى، ووجدته عنصرياً حقيراً، فهو يجمع أرقاماً عن قتلى العمليات الانتحارية لحماس ويقدم الرقم 473 قتيلاً من 79 عملية، إلا أنه يتجاوز قتل إسرائيل 4233 فلسطينياً في الفترة نفسها تقريباً، منهم 857 قاصراً، بعضهم بنات دون المراهقة وأطفال، ويبدو أنه لا يعتبر هؤلاء بشراً كالإسرائيليين أمثاله. وفي حين أعارض العمليات الانتحارية فإنني لم أسمع بعد أن ليفيت يعارض النازية الإسرائيلية.
اترك ليفيت تأكله أحقاده، وأعود الى زكي شهاب، فهو يعرف الشيخ أحمد ياسين، الأب الروحي لحماس، والعالِم المقعد الذي يعذب الإسرائيليون ابنه عبدالحميد أمامه حتى يعترف بدوره في تأسيس حماس، ويقدم أسماء الأعضاء المؤسسين، ومنهم من استشهد، ومنهم من عاش ليصبح وزيراً. وكان زكي شهاب أجرى مقابلات عدة للشيخ ياسين في جلسات طويلة، ونشرت «الحياة» بعضها، وهو زاد تفاصيل أخرى في الكتاب، كما قدم معلومات جديدة عن قادة حماس الآخرين، فهو يعرفهم في شكل مباشر، واتصاله بهم مستمر.
ان لم يكن موضوع الاهتمام حماس، فهو حزب الله، وهناك كتب عدة، ويكاد معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق الأدنى متخصصاً في تمويل الفصيلين والتحذير منهما نيابة عن إسرائيل. الباحث المتخصص يهمه مثل هذه الكتب، غير انني أقاوم شراءها حتى لا يستفيد الكاتب والناشر.
ربما كان كتاب كميل الطويل، «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب»، الصادر عن دار الساقي، أفضل كتاب عن الموضوع في السنوات العشر الأخيرة، والمؤسف أنه بالعربية، وحاجة الغربيين، خصوصاً الأميركيين، الى المعلومات الواردة فيه أكبر من حاجتنا، فمن أسباب مصيبة الأميركيين في أفغانستان والعراق وكل مكان، وجود خبراء مزعومين في الإرهاب، غالبيتهم تعمل ضمن أجندة إسرائيلية، ولا يعرفون عن الموضوع إلا ما يناسب التزامهم الإسرائيلي.
كميل الطويل محرر كبير في «الحياة» مسؤول عن الإسلاميين، ويعرفهم من الجزائر الى أفغانستان وباكستان وكل بلد في المنطقة. وهو جمع خبرته الآن في كتاب من 412 صفحة، فهرس الاعلام فيه يقع في عشر صفحات.
يقول كميل في المقدمة أن الجهاديين كانوا في الأصل يعتبرون الجهاد ضد الحكام «المرتدين» أولوية لهم، ولكن بعدما ضربهم الأميركيون في أفغانستان قرب نهاية 2001 وبداية 2002، تحولوا الى قتال «الكفار الأصليين»، أي حكام الدول الغربية، وعلى رأسها الولايات المتحدة. إلا أن التحول، في رأي المؤلف، هو لسبب آني ومحدد هو ان «الكفار» سبب بقاء «المرتدين» في حكم العالم الإسلامي، وإذا هزم «الكفار» سينهار المرتدون معهم.
ويختار المؤلف أن يعرض تاريخ جماعة الجهاد في مصر، والجماعة الإسلامية المسلحة في الجزائر، والجماعة الإسلامية المقاتلة في ليبيا، وأعرف بحكم الزمالة في العمل أن معلومات كميل عن هذه الجماعات مباشرة، وعلى امتداد سنوات. وهو يقول مفسراً اختياره ان تاريخ القاعدة لا يمكن أن يروى بمعزل عن أخواتها من جماعات الجهاد التي نشأ معظمها بعد انتهاء فترة الجهاد الأفغاني في نهاية الثمانينات وبداية التسعينات من القرن الماضي.
إذا كان القارئ لا يستطيع أن يقرأ سوى كتاب واحد عن الجهاديين فهو سيجد في «القاعدة وأخواتها» ضالته، والصفحات عن نشاط الجهاديين في السودان، حتى ضاقت حكومة البشير بهم، كنز من المعلومات عن تلك المرحلة، كما أن عودة أسامة بن لادن الى أفغانستان بعد سنواته في السودان تؤرخ بدقة لتلك المرحلة، والتنافس بين الجماعات العربية الوافدة، وبين المجاهدين الأفغان، والتحالفات والمؤامرات، وأدوار قادة معروفين، وآخرين لا يعرف بهم إلا من تابع هذه الجماعات من الداخل.
أرجو أن يترجم كتاب كميل الطويل الى الإنكليزية، ثم أرجو أن يقرأه أركان الإدارة الأميركية، ليجدوا ولو لمرة واحدة معلومات صحيحة، ربما ساعدتهم على اتخاذ قرارات صحيحة، أيضاً ولو مرة واحدة. وسأعود الى الكتب الجديدة خلال يومين.
«القاعدة وأخواتها» في كتاب لكميل الطويل ... «غزوة» نيويورك وواشنطن قفزة في مسارات المواجهة المفتوحة
أحمد جابر الحياة - 18/10/07//
| تفجيرات نيويورك وفي الاطار اسامة بن لادن وأيمن الظواهري |
«القاعدة وأخواتها، قصة الجهاديين العرب» كتاب للزميل في «الحياة» كميل الطويل (منشورات دار الساقي)، يتتبع فيه تفاصيل الظاهرة القتالية والسياسية، التي ورثت «حركة التحرر العربية»، وغطت بعنفها، على ما عرفه العالم الاسلامي من دعوات اعتدال ووسطية واحتكام الى آليات التطور الاجتماعي، الهادئة والبطيئة، التي لا تخرج على الانتظام الوطني العام، لكل بلد من البلدان.
يمسك كميل الطويل خيط الجهاد من أوله، فينطلق بسرد السيرة من أفغانستان، التي غزاها الاتحاد السوفياتي السابق، فاستنفر بفعلته عواطف عربية وإسلامية عامة، رعتها الولايات المتحدة الاميركية، ودعمتها بعض الأنظمة العربية، وغضّ الطرف عنها بعض آخر... كانت بداية المشاركة العربية الميدانية متدنية جداً، وشديدة التواضع، إذ ان «الجهاد» الذي كان أفغانياً كله، لم تتجاوز المساهمة العربية فيه، عام 1989، عدد «الخمسة عشر مقاتلاً»... إلا أن حال الالتحاق العربية لم تدم، فبعد الفتاوى التي اعتبرت الجهاد في أفغانستان «فرض عين»، تكاثرت الأعداد، وصارت للعرب بداية تنظيم مع «إنشاء مكتب الخدمات» الذي أشرف عليه أساساً الشيخ عبدالله عزام، وأسامة بن لادن... ومع التطور هذا باتت للمقاتلين العرب «معسكراتهم ومضافاتهم»، وكانت لهم استطراداً «جبهتهم القتالية المستقلة في جاجي» عام 1986، حيث عرف المقاتلون هناك، أول انتصار لهم على الروس، بقيادة بن لادن. وإذا كانت أفغانستان محطة الانطلاقة الأولى، ومنطقة إعادة التجميع، بعد محاولات الاستقرار التي عمد اليها «الجهاديون» عموماً... فإن ثمة نقاطاً أخرى كان لها دور حاكم في بلورة هيكليتهم التنظيمية، وفي اشتداد عود أفكارهم، وفي توسيع دائرة تحركاتهم، وبالتالي في تحول جهودهم المنفردة، الى صيغة «جبهة عالمية» ترى العالم من منظار «الفسطاطين» الذي بادر الرئيس الأميركي الحالي (بوش) الى الرؤية من خلال عدساته لاحقاً.
لقد احتل السودان مركزاً محورياً في «تكريس عالمية القاعدة»، وبات التنظيم، الذي انبثق من صيغة «سجل القاعدة» عام 1988، ومن فكرة ترتيب «معلومات وافية عن المجاهدين...» بات هذا التنظيم محور حركة إعدادية واسعة، ومرجعية إفتاء وتدريب واستقبال وإرسال وتخطيط وتنفيذ... وسيطرت عليه، في الحقبة السودانية، أفكار الجهاد، التي كان «المصريون» من حملة لوائها الأوائل، بقيادة أيمن الظواهري.
لم تكن «محطة لندن» أقل أهمية، وإن اختلف الدور المناط بها، فتحرك ناشطون من مختلف التنظيمات، وتحول مسجد «فنسبري بارك» منبراً للدعوة، ومساحات للاجتهاد ولتفاعل الآراء... ولم يتأخر «الجهاديون» في استغلال مساحة الحرية الإعلامية، المتروكة لهم، فأصدروا النشرات الخاصة بهم، فكانت «الأنصار الجزائرية، والفجر الليبية، والمجاهدون المصرية»... وكان البريطانيون، يومها، على مسافة، حدودها بالقول «ان بلدهم بلد حريات... يتعامل مع معارضين سياسيين... وهو على استعداد لحمايتهم، ما داموا لا يخرقون القانون البريطاني...». هذا التفسير السهل، للموقف البريطاني، لا يظهر جلياً الموقف من الجهاديين، بل إن التحليل يجب أن يذهب ليكشف عن كل مضامير السياسة البريطانية، حيال «الورقة الجهادية» وعن الحكمة من الموقف الذي اتخذ حيالها، وعن المقايضة، الآنية والمرحلية، التي كانت بريطانيا في صددها، وعن الرسائل السياسية التي كانت تود إبلاغها «لبلدان المنشأ» من خلال سياسة غض الطرف عن النشاط الإعلامي الواسع لـ «المجاهدين»!!... في كل الأحوال لم يتأخر «الذئب البريطاني عن إغلاق فمه» فأطلق الأمن البريطاني «عملية التحدي» بعد تفجير القاعدة للسفارتين الأميركيتين، في العاصمة الكينية، نيروبي، وفي دار السلام، عاصمة تنزانيا. كان ذلك إيذاناً بدق ناقوس الخطر، عالياً، سيسمع صداه لاحقاً فوق أرض الولايات المتحدة الأميركية.
ما اضطرت العاصمة البريطانية لفعله، حيال المجاهدين، شاركها فيه السودان، لأسبابه الخاصة، فدعا الى «إنهاء الدولة ضمن الدولة» التي أقامها المقاتلون العرب، واستجاب للضغوط العربية (المصرية بخاصة)، فلم تشفع لبن لادن شركاته واستثماراته داخل السودان، كذلك لم تستطع علاقاته الوثيقة مع النظام السوداني أن تمنع عنه كأس الهجرة الثانية الى أفغانستان.
على طول خط الرحلة، هذا، ثمة مسافرون من مختلف الجنسيات، يستوقفنا لديهم أمران: الأول أن أغلب قياداتهم تتمتع بدرجة علمية عالية، ما يدحض بداية فكرة اقتصار صفوف الجهاديين على «المهمشين» ويعيد الاعتبار الى ضرورة نقاش فكرة تحولات النخب العربية وانتقالها بين فكر شمولي وآخر... أما الأمر الثاني، فهو ان معظم الذين وفدوا الى أفغانستان، كمقاتلين، كانوا «بمثابة أوراق بيضاء» كتب عليها المختلفون حول سبل الجهاد وسياساته، ما شاؤوا، من دون ممانعة من المتلقين، الذين كانوا، كما ذُكر من دون خلفيات ثقافية سابقة. حاز الجهاديون المصريون في هذا المجال، قصب السبق، بسبب من «موروثهم» الثقافي المتقدم على الآخرين، وبسبب أيضاً، من خبرتهم الناتجة عن تجربتهم في المجال المصري.
الإشارة الى أسبقية التحصيل، والى النقاش الساخن ضمن صفوف الجهاديين، ترجع في جذورها أولاً الى اختلاف ظروف ساحات العمل الوطنية، للفصائل «الإسلامية» المتعددة، والى نوع الموروث الذي آل الى كل من هذه الفصائل. لا يمكن الإنكار في مجال الاختلاف هذا، ان جماعات الجزائر الاسلامية، قد تأثرت بـ «مخزون» ثورتها السابقة، وباعتيادها على أعمال القتال ضد «العدو المبـــاشر»، وباستسهالها الانتقال الى مناطقها الجبلية الوعرة، لتعيد إطلاق الكفاح المسلح، تحت رايات أفكار أخرى وشعارات مغايرة... في الماضي أطلقت النار ضد الاستعمار الفرنسي، وفي الراهن أفلتت الأعمال القتالية ضد «مغتصبي السلطة... الذين ارتدوا على نتائج الانتخابات الجزائرية»... في سياق الموروث السياسي عينه، كان لـ «الجماعة الليبية» طابعها الخاص، فلجأت الى الإعداد أولاً، وكانت المبادرة القتالية متأخرة، لكن الأحداث فــــاجأت «الجماعة» بعد أن ارتكب أعضاؤها الأخطاء... كذلك فوجئ النظام الليبي الذي كان يعتقد بوجود «الجهاديين» خارج حدوده، وكان مطمئناً الى أن معركته تدور فقط مع «جبهة الإنقاذ»... ومع محاولاتها الفاشلة لتنظيم انقلاب ضد الحكم القائم.
على الخط ذاته، جاء «المصريون» من تراث صاخب، فكرياً وسياسياً، فكانت في جعبتهم عملية اغتيال الرئيس أنور السادات، وقضية طلائع الفتح، ومجمل المواجهات الساخنة مع قوات الأمن المصرية... كان وضع «الجهاديين» هنا أرسخ، وقدمهم أثبت، وخلافهم الفكري أكثر صخباً، مما سينعكس لاحقاً في «المراجعات» التي أجرتها «الجماعة الاسلامية» فأفضت بها الى وقف الأعمال المسلحة في الداخل المصري... الأمر الذي رفضته «جماعة الجهاد»، فكان لها مع بن لادن، وبتأثير واضح من فكرها، «اجتهاد» نقل القتال الى العدو البعيد بدلاً من قتال العدو القريب... لقد اعتبرت «أميركا»، وفقاً لهذه الفتوى، مسؤولة عن صمود بعض الأنظمة العربية والإسلامية، لذلك، كان لا بد من «جهادها»... وإلحاق الهزيمة بها!! وصولاً الى إسقاط الأنظمة المحلية القائمة... بالتداعي!!
كحصيلة عامة، فشل الجهاديون العرب في البلدان – النماذج، الثلاثة، مصر والجزائر وليبيا، وفي كل بلد على حدة، تكشفت خصوصية مشكلاتهم، لكن ما جمع بين تجارب هؤلاء مجتمعين، أمور عدة، يمكن ذكر الأهم منها. لقد عرفت الفصائل المقاتلة «الأحادية»، بحيث لم تعر اهتماماً إلا للكفاح المسلح، ولم يعرف لها برنامج اجتماعي داخلي، أو رؤية سياسية مستقبلية للحكم، كذلك طبعت معظم الفصائل تلك بـ «النخبوية»، بمعنى محاولة إسقاط رؤاها الخاصة على المجتمعات، بغض النظر عن «آلية اشتغال الاجتماع» الداخلية لكل بلد، مما انتج تجاوزاً على المصالح المشروعة للمواطنين، واستبعاداً لهمومهم وتطلعاتهم اليومية، قابله إهمال متمادٍ لـ «الشعب» للأعمال الجهادية، وقلة اكتراث بها، مما حوّل هؤلاء، بحسب تعبير أحد قياديي الجهاد «نعمان بن عثمان» الى مجتمعات مغلقة موازية لها عالمها، خارج إطار المجتمع!! في التنظيم، كانت النخبوية واضحة، إذ كانت السرية هي الأساس، وإذ استثنينا، بحسب الكاتب، وضع الجماعة الإسلامية المصرية التي كانت تتمتع بحضور شعبي، فإنه لا يمكن الحديث عن «جماهيرية وشعبية»، أي من الفصائل الجهادية الأخرى... هذه الوضعية، سهّلت على أجهزة الأمن العربية المختلفة، تفكيك الخلايا السرية للجماعات ومطاردتها، فهذه لم تكن لها من حصانة سوى... السرية، ولم تتمتع بشرعية مجتمعية تقدم لها الاحتضان السياسي المطلوب...
المرور على «القاعدة» في أفغانستان أثناء الاحتلال السوفياتي، لا يلغي التوقف أمامها، إبان حكم طالبان لها، لتبيان شيء من العلاقة التي ربطت بين «الإسلاميين العرب» ونظرائهم من الجنسيات الأخرى.
لقد تجنب «العرب» منذ البداية الدخول في صراعات الفصائل الأفغانية، وإن كان لهم تحبيذهم لجماعات «سياف وحكمتيار وبرهان الدين رباني»... وهم، أي العرب، استمروا على حيادهم في ظل طالبان، وأفتى بعضهم بجواز «القتال في صفوفها والهجرة الى مناطقها»... إلا أن «حيادية العرب»، وفي سياق تطور العملية السياسية حول أفغانستان، لم تمنع طالبان من التدخل في شؤون هؤلاء. فقد طلبت منهم التوحد تحت راية بن لادن... ومنع إطلاق قذائف الهاون أثناء التدريب... ووضعت المعسكرات العربية كلها، بإمرة اللواء جمعة باي ماناغان، أي انها لجأت الى ما يخفف عنها الضغوط المتوالية من مصادر عربية وغير عربية... كيف كانت الاستجابة «العربية» لذلك؟ الموافقة عموماً، والاحتفاظ بحق الاعتراض على طالبان، إذا ما حاولت وقف «الجهاد» الذي جاء المقاتلون العرب من أجله.
يورد الكاتب في هذا الصدد، ان بن لادن وافق على وقف العمليات العسكرية انطـــلاقاً من أفغانســـتان، لكنه احتفظ لنفسه بحق القيام بالعملية الأخيرة: «غزوة نيويورك وواشنطن»... التي كانت الأخيرة فعلاً، لجهة إقامة حد فاصل بين مرحلة سابقة وأخرى لاحقة، على صعيد عالمي وإقليمي وعربي.
تستحق «الغزوة» تلك وقفة، لجهة الإعداد الدقيق لها. فقد أحيطت بسرية شبه كاملة، بحيث لم يعلم بأمرها إلا قلة لا تصل الى عدد أصابع اليد الواحدة، كذلك صنعت شبكة أمان لتحركات أفرادها بين العواصم، مثلما اعتمدت التمويه الواسع حول أماكن اجتماعاتها. اختيار الأفراد كان دقيقاً، وفردياً، بحيث تولاه وأشرف عليه أسامة بن لادن شخصياً، وجرى الاحتكام الى مواصفات الاختيار، التي كان من أهمها «الاستعداد للاستشهاد ومدى الصبر» بحسب خالد شيخ محمد، أحد الأساسيين في «الغزوة المشهورة». مع ذلك، لا بد من ملاحظة الاستعجال الذي أبداه بن لادن، لحصول التنفيذ، ليتلازم ذلك مع «ذكرى ضرب المدمرة الأميركية كول في اليمن، أو مع زيارة رئيس الوزراء الاسرائيلي، آرييل شارون للمسجد الأقصى».
كذلك، كان لافتاً الإصرار على التنفيذ، حيث ان «من يفشل في ضرب الهدف المحدد له، يُســــقط طائرته ولو في شوارع نيويورك». أخيراً حصلت الضـــربة، وكانت لها نتائجها المدوية، فانهارت «رموز أميركية» وفي أعقابها انهار نظام طالبان، وطردت «القاعدة» من باكستان، حيث مقر الاحتضان الدافئ، الى كل دولة عربية متضررة. لم يتوقع بن لادن حجم «أخدود سبتمبر» اللاحق، لكنه، ربما، حقق حلمه في جرّ أميركا و «المسلمين» الى مواجهة عالمية.
بعد سنوات على الحدث الأميركي، وعلى الانهيار الطالباني، و «القاعدي» استطراداً، يحق لنا ان نسأل: هل بات العالم على أبواب معادلة سياسية هادئة؟ الأجوبة سلبية. هذا ما يؤكده الواقع العراقي الذي شكل ميدان «الثأر الأميركي» الأصلي، وهذا ما يثبته واقع استعادة «طالبان» لعافيتها في أفغانستان، وهذا ما يلحّ عليه، انسداد آفاق التسوية العربية – الاسرائيلية، التي لا عنوان لها سوى: الاعتراف بالحقوق الوطنية المشروعة للشعب الفلسطيني... عليه نخشى القول، اننا ما زلنا في دوامة الصلف الأميركي، والعمى الجهادي، الذي لن ينتج بالتأكيد سوى مزيد من «الغزوات» الهمجية المتبادلة.
كاتب لبناني
assafir newspaper
http://www.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleId=2011&EditionId=770&ChannelId=17246
كرم الحلو
بعد خمس سنوات على بدء «الحرب ضد الارهاب» وبعد الانتصارات الكبيرة التي حققها الاميركيون في هذه الحرب، بتدميرهم عشرات معسكرات التدريب التي بناها «الجهاديون» في أفغانستان، وطردهم أسامة بن لادن وقادة تنظيمه من عرينهم الأفغاني وتشتيتهم في أرجاء المعمورة ليُقتل منهم الآلاف ويُعتقل الآلاف ويُشرد الآلاف، يبدو الأميركيون اليوم بعيدين جدا عن تحقيق نصر حاسم، ان لم يكونوا في الحقيقة أقرب الى الهزيمة.
هذه النتيجة المخيبة تشكل الخلاصة الأساسية التي انطلق منها كميل الطويل في كتابه «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب» (دار الساقي 2007)، اذ ان المحصلة جاءت في رأيه، على غير ما توخاه الأميركيون. ففي أفغانستان، حيث تحقق انتصارهم الأكبر، أعادت حركة «طالبان» التقاط أنفاسها وباتت تسيطر على مناطق واسعة من جنوب البلاد، وجنوبها الشرقي، معقل مؤيديها البشتون الذين يشكلون غالبية سكان البلاد. وفي العراق تبدو جماعة «المقاومة» السنية حصرا، قادرة على اشغال الاميركيين في «مستنقع» يستنزف طاقاتهم الى ما لا نهاية. أما «القاعدة» محور الحرب ضد الارهاب، فتبدو المستفيد الأول من غرق الأميركيين في أوحال أفغانستان والعراق. فقد نجحت في امتصاص الضربات التي تلقتها وأعادت تنظيم صفوفها في مراكز انتشارها في مناطق الحدود الباكستانية الافغانية، كما أنها حققت «العالمية» التي طمحت اليها منذ نشأتها عام ,1988 اذ أدت المواجهة بينها وبين الأميركيين الى تشظيها خلايا تنتشر في أنحاء الكرة الأرضية لم يعد سهلا حصرها، ما حول حربها معهم لحرب عالمية بالفعل.
لقد حققت القاعدة أيضا ما سعت اليه منذ البداية، وهو تحويل حربها ضد الغرب، لحرب دينية يرى فيها المسلمون أنفسهم مستهدفين من «الكفار» الغربيين. فتوسيع الأميركيين دائرة حربهم على «الارهاب» لتشمل أكثر من جماعة اسلامية، وحد غالبية «الجهاديين» وراء مشروع بن لادن الذي أعطى الأولوية لقتال «الكفار الأصليين» من حكام الدول الغربية وعلى رأسهم أميركا، الأمر الذي كان لكثير من «الجهاديين» تحفظات عليه، لاعطائهم الأولوية لقتال «المرتدين» في بلدانهم وليس «الكفار» في الغرب.
رأى المؤلف أنه لا يمكن فهم هذا التحول في فكر الجهاديين من دون رواية تاريخ القاعدة وتاريخ أخواتها من جماعات الجهاد الأخرى القريبة منها فكرا ومنهجا، مكتفيا في كتابه بتناول جماعات الجهاد في ثلاث دول عربية هي «جماعة الجهاد» في مصر و«الجماعة الاسلامية المسلحة» في الجزائر و«الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» في ليبيا، كون هذه الجماعات ساهمت في تكوين «القاعدة» في صورتها الحالية، ايديولوجية و«ممارسة»، وقد اختارها المؤلف لسببين: أولهما نشوؤها جميعا في بيئة واحدة ـ بيئة الأفغان العرب ـ وفي وقت متزامن في نهاية الثمانينيات وبداية التسعينيات. فـ «جماعة الجهاد» و«الجماعة الاسلامية» المصريتان، وان كانتا قد ظهرتا في نهاية الستينيات وبداية السبعينيات، الا ان الجهاديين المصريين أعادوا بناء التنظيمين اعتبارا من عام 1987 ليس في مصر، بل على الحدود الباكستانية الأفغانية، بالتزامن مع تأسيس بن لادن تنظيم «القاعدة» عام 1988 ومع تأسيس الأفغان الجزائريين «الجماعة الاسلامية المسلحة» عام 1991 ومع تأسيس الليبيين «الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» بين عام 1990 و.1992 وثانيهما ان هذه الجماعات هي الوحيدة في العالم العربي التي خاضت حربا حقيقية في تسعينيات القرن الماضي لاسقاط أنظمة الحكم في بلدانها لاعتبارها أنظمة «مرتدة».
ولم تكن القاعدة بعيدة عن هذه «التجارب الجهادية» للجماعات الثلاث، فبن لادن كان على علاقة وثيقة بجماعة الجهاد المصرية وزعيمها أيمن الظواهري، وكذلك بـ «الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» الليبية كما كان له تأثير مباشر في «الجماعة المسلحة الجزائرية».
بعد تعرض مشاريع الجهاديين في مصر والجزائر وليبيا لنكسات متتالية بعد عودتهم من أفغانستان بعد منتصف التسعينيات من القرن الماضي، لجأ هؤلاء مجددا الى أفغانستان ليعيدوا فيها بناء تنظيماتهم. ولم يكن اختيارهم أفغانستان من قبيل الصدفة، فهذا البلد كان البداية لما يعرف اليوم بجماعات «السلفية الجهادية» وريثة جماعات «الجهاد» الأولى في العالم العربي. ففي خضم المعارك ضد «الجيش الأحمر» نشأ جيل جديد من العرب يؤمن بالجهاد لاقامة حكم اسلامي حقيقي يخلف الأنظمة التي اعتبرها هؤلاء، إما «مرتدة» او أنها لا تطبق الشريعة تطبيقا صحيحا. واذا كانت بداية الجهاد أفغانية بحتة قادها وطنيون أفغانيون معروفون بنشاطهم في الحركة الاسلامية، في حين لم يكن عدد العرب المشاركين في القتال يتجاوز الـ 15 عام ,1984 الا ان الوجود العربي في أفغانستان سرعان ما أخذ في الازدياد، اذ شعرت التنظيمات الجهادية العربية بأن ثمة فرصة سانحة لها في هذا البلد لاعداد مقاتلين وتدريبهم واعادتهم الى بلدانهم لبدء مشروع جهادي. وقد لقي العرب الأفغان الدعم والمؤازرة سواء من جانب حكوماتهم او من جانب أميركا التي كانت تعمل جاهدة لطرد الروس من أفغانستان.
اختلفت اعادة البناء في أفغانستان بين جماعات الجهاد العربية، ففي حين تحالفت جماعة الجهاد المصرية مع القاعدة تحالفا تحول عام 2001 اندماجا كاملا، اختط الجزائريون والليبيون خطا مستقلا عن بن لادن والظواهري اللذين مضيا قدما في تنفيذ خطتهما لقتال الاميركيين، بتفجير سفارتي الولايات المتحدة في نيروبي ودار السلام عام ,1998 ثم تفجير المدمرة الاميركية يو أس أس كول في عدن عام ,2000 انتهاء بغزوة سبتمبر في قلب أميركا عام 2001 التي غيرت أميركا كما غيرت الجهاديين أنفسهم، اذ لم تفرق الاستخبارات الأميركية في حربها ضد الارهاب بين الجهاديين القاعديين وغير القاعديين، ووضعتهم جميعهم في سلة واحدة، وصار العالم في نظر بوش قسمين ـ معنا او ضدنا.
في ظل هذا المنحى الايديولوجي الجديد صار تنظيم القاعدة «الأب الروحي» لكل جماعات الجهاد التي بايعت بن لادن وأصبحت تعمل بالتنسيق معه. وهكذا حققت أميركا لبن لادن ما لم يستطع تحقيقه على مدى خمس سنوات في أفغانستان: توحيد الجهاديين تحت لواء القاعدة وتحولها لمركز استقطاب لكل جماعات الجهاد في العالم.
في رؤية اجمالية يمكن القول ان المؤلف قد أسهم في كتابه «القاعدة وأخواتها» في الاضاءة على جوانب من الحركة السياسية في العالم العربي لم تأخذ حقها الى الآن من البحث والدراسة والتنقيب، برصده تاريخ جماعات الجهــاد في ثلاث دول عربية وآلية تطور هذه الجماعات وتفاعلها مع أحداث الثمانينيات والتسعينيات من القرن الماضي ومطلع القرن الحالي واسهامها الفعلي في تكوين «القاعدة» في صورتها الراهنة، ما أسدى خدمة الى الفكر السياسي العربي، هو أحوج ما يكون اليها. لكن ثمة ثغرات ونواقص شابت الكتاب، منها:
أ ـ التكرار والاستعادة والاستطراد واللغة الفجة، فضلا عن اضطراب المنهجية المعتمدة وعدم ورود المعلومات الغزيرة والدقيقة في تتبع آثار «الجهاديين» في سياق محكم، وفقدان الترابط والاتساق في ما بينها أحيانا كثيرة بشكل تكاد تضيع معه البوصلة الموجهة للكتاب.
ب ـ ضمور الجانب الايديولوجي او غيابه بالكامل، اذ ان المؤلف لم يتوقف امام الخلفية المؤسسة للحركات الجهادية في العالمين العربي والاسلامي. لماذا نشأت هذه الحركات وتصاعدت واستشرت منذ الربع الأخير من القرن الماضي؟ ما علاقة ذلك بانهيار المشروع القومي العلماني في العالم العربي ودور الغرب في ذلك الانهيار؟ أليس ثمة صلة مباشرة بين الحركات الأصولية الجهادية وبين النهب المنظم الذي مارسته وتمارسه الرأسمالية الغربية المتوحشة بحق الشعوب العربية والاسلامية باغتصاب ثرواتها ومواردها ودعم انظمتها التسلطية القمعية؟ أليس من دور كذلك لاغتصاب فلسطـين وانتهاك مقدسات العرب والمسلمين والاحجام عن تطبيق القرارات الدولية، في صعود حركات الجهاد الاسلامي منذ الثمانينيات الى اليوم؟ هل في الثقافة العربية الاسلامية بالذات ما يؤسس للعنف ورفض الآخر والأحادية العقائدية، العناصر الأساسية المكونة للمنحى الأصولي التكفيري، على ما يذهب الاستشراقيون ومعهم بعض المفكرين العرب؟
أسئلة كثيرة لم يقترب منها المؤلف، ولعل كتابه يكون حافزا للبحث فيها وفي الأجوبة المناسبة عنها.
(لله) كميل الطويل «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب» «دار الساقي» 2007
كرم الحلو
بعد خمس سنوات على بدء «الحرب ضد الارهاب» وبعد الانتصارات الكبيرة التي حققها الاميركيون في هذه الحرب، بتدميرهم عشرات معسكرات التدريب التي بناها «الجهاديون» في أفغانستان، وطردهم أسامة بن لادن وقادة تنظيمه من عرينهم الأفغاني وتشتيتهم في أرجاء المعمورة ليُقتل منهم الآلاف ويُعتقل الآلاف ويُشرد الآلاف، يبدو الأميركيون اليوم بعيدين جدا عن تحقيق نصر حاسم، ان لم يكونوا في الحقيقة أقرب الى الهزيمة.
هذه النتيجة المخيبة تشكل الخلاصة الأساسية التي انطلق منها كميل الطويل في كتابه «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب» (دار الساقي 2007)، اذ ان المحصلة جاءت في رأيه، على غير ما توخاه الأميركيون. ففي أفغانستان، حيث تحقق انتصارهم الأكبر، أعادت حركة «طالبان» التقاط أنفاسها وباتت تسيطر على مناطق واسعة من جنوب البلاد، وجنوبها الشرقي، معقل مؤيديها البشتون الذين يشكلون غالبية سكان البلاد. وفي العراق تبدو جماعة «المقاومة» السنية حصرا، قادرة على اشغال الاميركيين في «مستنقع» يستنزف طاقاتهم الى ما لا نهاية. أما «القاعدة» محور الحرب ضد الارهاب، فتبدو المستفيد الأول من غرق الأميركيين في أوحال أفغانستان والعراق. فقد نجحت في امتصاص الضربات التي تلقتها وأعادت تنظيم صفوفها في مراكز انتشارها في مناطق الحدود الباكستانية الافغانية، كما أنها حققت «العالمية» التي طمحت اليها منذ نشأتها عام ,1988 اذ أدت المواجهة بينها وبين الأميركيين الى تشظيها خلايا تنتشر في أنحاء الكرة الأرضية لم يعد سهلا حصرها، ما حول حربها معهم لحرب عالمية بالفعل.
لقد حققت القاعدة أيضا ما سعت اليه منذ البداية، وهو تحويل حربها ضد الغرب، لحرب دينية يرى فيها المسلمون أنفسهم مستهدفين من «الكفار» الغربيين. فتوسيع الأميركيين دائرة حربهم على «الارهاب» لتشمل أكثر من جماعة اسلامية، وحد غالبية «الجهاديين» وراء مشروع بن لادن الذي أعطى الأولوية لقتال «الكفار الأصليين» من حكام الدول الغربية وعلى رأسهم أميركا، الأمر الذي كان لكثير من «الجهاديين» تحفظات عليه، لاعطائهم الأولوية لقتال «المرتدين» في بلدانهم وليس «الكفار» في الغرب.
رأى المؤلف أنه لا يمكن فهم هذا التحول في فكر الجهاديين من دون رواية تاريخ القاعدة وتاريخ أخواتها من جماعات الجهاد الأخرى القريبة منها فكرا ومنهجا، مكتفيا في كتابه بتناول جماعات الجهاد في ثلاث دول عربية هي «جماعة الجهاد» في مصر و«الجماعة الاسلامية المسلحة» في الجزائر و«الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» في ليبيا، كون هذه الجماعات ساهمت في تكوين «القاعدة» في صورتها الحالية، ايديولوجية و«ممارسة»، وقد اختارها المؤلف لسببين: أولهما نشوؤها جميعا في بيئة واحدة ـ بيئة الأفغان العرب ـ وفي وقت متزامن في نهاية الثمانينيات وبداية التسعينيات. فـ «جماعة الجهاد» و«الجماعة الاسلامية» المصريتان، وان كانتا قد ظهرتا في نهاية الستينيات وبداية السبعينيات، الا ان الجهاديين المصريين أعادوا بناء التنظيمين اعتبارا من عام 1987 ليس في مصر، بل على الحدود الباكستانية الأفغانية، بالتزامن مع تأسيس بن لادن تنظيم «القاعدة» عام 1988 ومع تأسيس الأفغان الجزائريين «الجماعة الاسلامية المسلحة» عام 1991 ومع تأسيس الليبيين «الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» بين عام 1990 و.1992 وثانيهما ان هذه الجماعات هي الوحيدة في العالم العربي التي خاضت حربا حقيقية في تسعينيات القرن الماضي لاسقاط أنظمة الحكم في بلدانها لاعتبارها أنظمة «مرتدة».
ولم تكن القاعدة بعيدة عن هذه «التجارب الجهادية» للجماعات الثلاث، فبن لادن كان على علاقة وثيقة بجماعة الجهاد المصرية وزعيمها أيمن الظواهري، وكذلك بـ «الجماعة الاسلامية المقاتلة» الليبية كما كان له تأثير مباشر في «الجماعة المسلحة الجزائرية».
بعد تعرض مشاريع الجهاديين في مصر والجزائر وليبيا لنكسات متتالية بعد عودتهم من أفغانستان بعد منتصف التسعينيات من القرن الماضي، لجأ هؤلاء مجددا الى أفغانستان ليعيدوا فيها بناء تنظيماتهم. ولم يكن اختيارهم أفغانستان من قبيل الصدفة، فهذا البلد كان البداية لما يعرف اليوم بجماعات «السلفية الجهادية» وريثة جماعات «الجهاد» الأولى في العالم العربي. ففي خضم المعارك ضد «الجيش الأحمر» نشأ جيل جديد من العرب يؤمن بالجهاد لاقامة حكم اسلامي حقيقي يخلف الأنظمة التي اعتبرها هؤلاء، إما «مرتدة» او أنها لا تطبق الشريعة تطبيقا صحيحا. واذا كانت بداية الجهاد أفغانية بحتة قادها وطنيون أفغانيون معروفون بنشاطهم في الحركة الاسلامية، في حين لم يكن عدد العرب المشاركين في القتال يتجاوز الـ 15 عام ,1984 الا ان الوجود العربي في أفغانستان سرعان ما أخذ في الازدياد، اذ شعرت التنظيمات الجهادية العربية بأن ثمة فرصة سانحة لها في هذا البلد لاعداد مقاتلين وتدريبهم واعادتهم الى بلدانهم لبدء مشروع جهادي. وقد لقي العرب الأفغان الدعم والمؤازرة سواء من جانب حكوماتهم او من جانب أميركا التي كانت تعمل جاهدة لطرد الروس من أفغانستان.
اختلفت اعادة البناء في أفغانستان بين جماعات الجهاد العربية، ففي حين تحالفت جماعة الجهاد المصرية مع القاعدة تحالفا تحول عام 2001 اندماجا كاملا، اختط الجزائريون والليبيون خطا مستقلا عن بن لادن والظواهري اللذين مضيا قدما في تنفيذ خطتهما لقتال الاميركيين، بتفجير سفارتي الولايات المتحدة في نيروبي ودار السلام عام ,1998 ثم تفجير المدمرة الاميركية يو أس أس كول في عدن عام ,2000 انتهاء بغزوة سبتمبر في قلب أميركا عام 2001 التي غيرت أميركا كما غيرت الجهاديين أنفسهم، اذ لم تفرق الاستخبارات الأميركية في حربها ضد الارهاب بين الجهاديين القاعديين وغير القاعديين، ووضعتهم جميعهم في سلة واحدة، وصار العالم في نظر بوش قسمين ـ معنا او ضدنا.
في ظل هذا المنحى الايديولوجي الجديد صار تنظيم القاعدة «الأب الروحي» لكل جماعات الجهاد التي بايعت بن لادن وأصبحت تعمل بالتنسيق معه. وهكذا حققت أميركا لبن لادن ما لم يستطع تحقيقه على مدى خمس سنوات في أفغانستان: توحيد الجهاديين تحت لواء القاعدة وتحولها لمركز استقطاب لكل جماعات الجهاد في العالم.
في رؤية اجمالية يمكن القول ان المؤلف قد أسهم في كتابه «القاعدة وأخواتها» في الاضاءة على جوانب من الحركة السياسية في العالم العربي لم تأخذ حقها الى الآن من البحث والدراسة والتنقيب، برصده تاريخ جماعات الجهــاد في ثلاث دول عربية وآلية تطور هذه الجماعات وتفاعلها مع أحداث الثمانينيات والتسعينيات من القرن الماضي ومطلع القرن الحالي واسهامها الفعلي في تكوين «القاعدة» في صورتها الراهنة، ما أسدى خدمة الى الفكر السياسي العربي، هو أحوج ما يكون اليها. لكن ثمة ثغرات ونواقص شابت الكتاب، منها:
أ ـ التكرار والاستعادة والاستطراد واللغة الفجة، فضلا عن اضطراب المنهجية المعتمدة وعدم ورود المعلومات الغزيرة والدقيقة في تتبع آثار «الجهاديين» في سياق محكم، وفقدان الترابط والاتساق في ما بينها أحيانا كثيرة بشكل تكاد تضيع معه البوصلة الموجهة للكتاب.
ب ـ ضمور الجانب الايديولوجي او غيابه بالكامل، اذ ان المؤلف لم يتوقف امام الخلفية المؤسسة للحركات الجهادية في العالمين العربي والاسلامي. لماذا نشأت هذه الحركات وتصاعدت واستشرت منذ الربع الأخير من القرن الماضي؟ ما علاقة ذلك بانهيار المشروع القومي العلماني في العالم العربي ودور الغرب في ذلك الانهيار؟ أليس ثمة صلة مباشرة بين الحركات الأصولية الجهادية وبين النهب المنظم الذي مارسته وتمارسه الرأسمالية الغربية المتوحشة بحق الشعوب العربية والاسلامية باغتصاب ثرواتها ومواردها ودعم انظمتها التسلطية القمعية؟ أليس من دور كذلك لاغتصاب فلسطـين وانتهاك مقدسات العرب والمسلمين والاحجام عن تطبيق القرارات الدولية، في صعود حركات الجهاد الاسلامي منذ الثمانينيات الى اليوم؟ هل في الثقافة العربية الاسلامية بالذات ما يؤسس للعنف ورفض الآخر والأحادية العقائدية، العناصر الأساسية المكونة للمنحى الأصولي التكفيري، على ما يذهب الاستشراقيون ومعهم بعض المفكرين العرب؟
أسئلة كثيرة لم يقترب منها المؤلف، ولعل كتابه يكون حافزا للبحث فيها وفي الأجوبة المناسبة عنها.
(لله) كميل الطويل «القاعدة وأخواتها: قصة الجهاديين العرب» «دار الساقي» 2007
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